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I. INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANCE OF “RELEVANCE”
IN JUDGMENTS OF EQUALITY
In day-to-day life, one is compelled to compare. In replying to a
question on one’s favorite things, one will group them together based
on the satisfaction one is provided with, leaving out the rest. In discussing
the issue of spiteful people, one is promptly reminded of some common
features of individuals whose actions typically meet the required criteria
(or the criteria one sets for such category). In metaphorical speech—for
instance, by descriptively asserting that “no man is an island”—one grounds
the assertion on past knowledge of the prototypical isolation of islands to,
then, negate the transfer of such features to human beings, also based on
past knowledge that they lack self-sufficiency and require partaking in
any kind of community to thrive. Lastly, if one wishes to open a box with
no scissors or knifes at hand, one might try with a key, if sharp enough:
by purporting to do so, one is setting an analogy insofar one is transferring
structural information (functionality for said purpose, i.e., the active disposition
to cut through) from a source (scissors and knifes) to a target (sharpenough keys).
The capacity to set analogies and categorize is naturally limited by
many things: I have no intention to be exhaustive, thus I will just name a
few. It is limited, on the one hand, by the information included in the
knowledgebase (e.g., one cannot list skydiving as a favorite thing if one
has not even heard about it) and, on the other, by the degree of what in
cognitive psychology is called “perceptual similarity,” which is developed
with age and acquisition of expertise.1 It is also limited by the set of terms
of comparison: analogies and categories always fall prey to the availability
bias which consists in heavily weighing judgments toward more recent
information, making new opinions biased toward latest news. Thirdly, it
would also be naïf to claim that reasoning by analogy is not impacted by

1. Stella Vosniadou, Analogical Reasoning as a Mechanism in Knowledge Acquisition: a Developmental Perspective, in SIMILARITY AND ANALOGICAL REASONING 413, 421 (S.
Vosniadou & A. Ortony eds., 1989); Ann Brown, Analogical Learning and Transfer:
What Develops, in Similarity and Analogical Reasoning 369, 372 ff. (S. Vosniadou & A.
Ortony eds., 1989).

332

LOPESNEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 331, 2022]

10/27/2022 10:36 AM

Relevance and Equality
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISUES

background theories, to the extent that it is claimed that all knowledge is
“theory-infused.”2 Analogies and categories are formulated in a context
of tendency, related to cognitive dissonance, to seek or interpret information
in such a way that it confirms one’s preconceptions and discredit that
which does not support it. Furthermore, similarities are somehow dependent
upon people’s underlying representations—beliefs and phenomenal experience,
—not necessarily based on whether they represent simple, descriptive
properties.3 The issue of these “salient similarities” becomes very clear,
for instance, in discussions regarding descriptive similarities of same-sex
couples if the discussants do not share underlying representations. Naturally,
that is linked with the “status quo” bias towards things remaining relatively
the same and avoiding disruptions and “stereotyping”—that is, hoping for
a member of the projected category to possess certain properties and behave
in a certain way without having any relevant information about that
particular.4
Legal speech requires comparisons just as much as ordinary speech. To
assign deontic status to a given action-type φ performed by a group of
individuals P in occasion Q, a lawmaker is required to compare. It is understood
that “smoking is forbidden in closed rooms” assigns the deontic status F
to the action-type “smoking” when performed by all individuals, provided

2. DEAN BURNETT, THE IDIOT BRAIN: A NEUROSCIENTIST EXPLAINS WHAT YOUR
HEAD IS REALLY UP TO 177 ff. (2016).
3. On differentiating “surface similarities” and “salient similarities,” the latter
connected with people’s underlying representations, see Vosniadou, supra note 1, at 419.
The example is quite illuminating: “[u]sing the earth as a source analog from which to
reason about the moon may thus be considered rather trivial. Yet most children in our
studies of knowledge acquisition in astronomy (. . .) would never use the earth as a source
analog from which to reason about the moon, although adults would. The reason is that
until the end of the elementary school years many children do not really believe that the
earth is a sphere. Children’s phenomenal experience that the earth is flat is so strong that
information coming from adult sources regarding the shape of the earth is consistently
misinterpreted. Furthermore, many children do not know that the moon is spherical either.
Many believe that the moon is shaped like a crescent or that it is circular but flat, like a
disc. It is apparent from the above that the characterization of “spherical” as an object
attribute of the earth and the moon carries no implications as to whether this is an easily
accessible property of the objects in question or not.”
4. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974); Drew Westen, Pavel Blagov, Keith Harenski,
Clint Kilts & Stephan Hamann, Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An FMRI Study of
Emotional Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 1947 (2006).
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the door is not open.5 One would say that there are good reasons to liken
men and women (addressees) and not distinguish whether cigarettes and
cigars are to be smoked (action-tokens), albeit there are also valid reasons
to differentiate smoking in the occasion of closed doors, as opposed to
smoking with the window open. Loosely speaking, the differentiation is
tantamount to asserting a criterion of not harming the health of others,
while pari passu presupposing that a window or door open, given the
dimension of the room, is good enough reason to balance in favor of
permitting smoking in said circumstances. In other words—and I will get
back to the subject below—whether the door/window is open is critical
for the deontic status of the action: P or F.
What one seems to be searching for is equalities and differences, based
on given a standard of evaluation, precisely the one that sets the relevant
criteria for comparison. For instance, suppose a given constitution forbids
same-sex marriage. Suppose no reason in the travaux préparatoires is given
for the assignment of such deontic status. It may be argued that “same-sex
couples are different from heterosexual couples,” but this statement is
nonsensical, elliptical at best. Even if one abstracts from the holistic comparison
where specific features are not specifically addressed, no criteria is set
forth for comparison. Now suppose it is claimed that the prohibition is
grounded on the biological inability to produce offspring: the outcome of
the comparison is, naturally, the highlight of a biological distinction
between same-sex and heterosexual couples. But it very well seems the
criterion is unsuitable: if one is searching for the relevant property of the
ability to reproduce, the category reaches too far and is overinclusive to
the extent it equally includes sterile heterosexual couples. If one counterargues that the criterion should be the ability to reproduce if there were no
medical conditions preventing such outcome, one would still be grounding a
distinction based on a biological possibility which is logically unrelated
to the action-type of “marrying.” Furthermore, such distinction would be
pragmatically conflictive with constitutional permissions to raise a family
(as it is common). The example simply goes to show that the choice of
criteria of comparison is of paramount importance and that one should
be as rigorous in transferring (or not) the “suitable” structural information
from source to target in any comparison as one should be in designing
categories.

5. On the distinction between “action-types” and “action-tokens,” see Linda Wetzel, Types and Tokens, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta
ed., 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/types-tokens/ [https://perma.cc/
HU74-T4QY] .

334

LOPESNEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 331, 2022]

10/27/2022 10:36 AM

Relevance and Equality
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISUES

II. THE BASIC CONCEPTUAL APPARATUS OF SIMILARITY
AND EQUALITY
A. Introduction: Similarity, Identity and “Descriptive” Equality
It is not uncommon in ordinary speech to use the terms “identical”,
“equal” or “similar” with the same purpose. It is not even uncommon to
assign the same meaning to those terms. For instance, the statement “your
two daughters look perfectly identical” has the (toned-down) technical
meaning that will be assigned below to “similar”, whilst the statement
“women and men should be treated in similar fashion” has the (toned-up)
technical meaning that will be assigned below to “equal.”
Even in legal (technical) speech, some authors use some of these terms
interchangeably. Westen writes that “although some authorities distinguish
between the terms ‘like,’ ‘similar,’ ‘equal,’ ‘identical,’ and ‘the same,’ unless
I explicitly indicate otherwise, I shall assume that these terms are interchangeable
for purposes of the proposition that ‘equals should be treated equally.’”6
This statement, however, may provide the wrong picture about Westen’s
theory as he does distinguish between some of those terms. Much unlike
other legal scholars, Westen does accept that “equal” may have a meaning
other than “similar.” Indeed, it does—or, at least, it should.7 As should
“different,” “dissimilar,” and “unequal” have different meanings amongst
themselves.8
Definitions play a large role in analytical philosophy in clarifying the
sense and reference of what is being uttered and in distinguishing different
realities, so I should jump right into it.

6. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540 n.10 (1982).
See also Leticia Gianformaggio, “Like”–“Equal”–“Similar”: Are They to be Treated Alike?,
in NORMATIVE S YSTEMS IN LEGAL AND MORAL THEORY : F ESTSCHRIFT FOR CARLOS E.
ALCHOURRÓN AND EUGENIO BULYGIN 251, 255 (Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Werner Krawietz,
Georg Henrik Von Wright & Ruth Zimmerling eds., 1997).
7. See Paolo Comanducci, Igualdad, in DEMOCRACIA, DERECHOS E INTERPRETACIÓN
JURÍDICA—ENSAYOS DE TEORIA ANALÍTICA DEL DERECHO 29, 32 (2010) (claiming that
“equal” and “identical” are not simply equivalent, but with the carve-out that “that does
not mean that in ordinary speech ‘identical’ is used as a synonym of ‘equal’”).
8. Hinting at the differences between “different” and “unequal” by claiming that
the latter entails some sort of violation of equality, see Gianformaggio, supra note 6, at
271 n.79.
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B. Similarity
I take “similarity” to mean that two or more objects (particulars) are in
a relation such that they share one or more properties.9 This is the very
basic notion, consisting of relations between “particulars” and “properties.”
It is subject to further discussions.
Firstly, it should be noted that similarity is itself not a property, rather
a “relation” between two or more objects or terms. According to Russell,
a relation unites terms: “a relation is distinguished as dual, triple, quadruple,
etc., or dyadic, triadic, tetradic, etc., according to the number of terms which it
unites in the simplest complexes in which it occurs.”10
Secondly, in asserting a “similarity fact” between two or more objects,
a given property is required to be singled out: a and b are always (dis)similar
with regards to a given property.11 Asserting that “a and b are similar” is
an elliptical statement and so is asserting that “a and b are equal.” That, however, is not the case in asserting that “a and b are identical.”
Thirdly, some authors claim that asserting a similarity fact presupposes
two or more objects sharing at least one relevant property.12 But this
statement can be misleading: it highly depends upon how the concept of
“relevance” is being used in the context. Relevance may be defined, for
the purpose at hand, as a predicate of a property of a particular, that which
denotes the relation of a property of a particular with a given standard of
relevance: a property of a particular is said to be relevant if and only if
(henceforth “iff”), when contrasted with a given standard of relevance (e.g., a
moral system), that property of that particular instantiates a hypothetical
property represented in that standard of relevance.13 I am using “instantiation”
qua “property possession” here.14

9. See Javier Cumpa, The Neutralist Analysis of Similarity, 49 PHILOSOPHIA 37, 43
(2021); Linda Smith, From Global Similarities do Kinds of Similarities: the Construction
of Dimensions in Development, in SIMILARITY AND ANALOGICAL REASONING 146, 161, 165
(S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony eds., 1989); Ilkka Niiniluoto, Analogy and Similarity in Scientific
Reasoning, in ANALOGICAL REASONING—PERSPECTIVES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,
COGNITIVE SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY 271, 272 (D.H. Helman ed., 1988).
10. Bertrand Russell, On the Relation of Universals and Particulars, 12 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1, 5 (1911).
11. For the sake of simplicity, I will merely refer, from now on, to relations between
“objects.”
12. Stressing that similarity entails that two or more objects “possess” at least one
“relevant property” in common, see Comanducci, supra note 7, at 33.
13. On “relevance” as a relation, claiming that A may be said to be relevant only in
respect to a given B, see Yovel, Jonathan Yovel, Two Conceptions of Relevance, 34 Cybernetics
& Systems 283, 309 (2003). See also GIOVANNI BATTISTA RATTI, EL GOBIERNO DE LAS
NORMAS 61 ( 2013).
14. A neutralist account of instantiation as in Cumpa, supra note 9, at 1 n.1.
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As it will be seen below, judgments of equality entail selecting a standard
of evaluation of two or more objects which, in turn, amounts to highlighting
one or more relevant properties that preside over the comparison and
determine the categorization.15 Equality entails disregarding dissimilarities
between two particulars, much like constructing a self -constricting
“tunnel-like” field of vision that considers shared properties only.16 It
entails establishing, setting up, or instituting a relation of equivalence that
does not take into consideration the existing dissimilarities between two
objects.17 But the same does not happen in similarity: a and b are not
judged, evaluated, established, or instituted as similar; they are simply
described as similar.18
Naturally, describing a and b as similar presupposes singling out a
shared property, that which is necessary for the assertion of the similarity
fact. But singling out property q says nothing about the relevance of
property q other than that the similarity fact is conditional to property q.
It merely says that it is property q that is under scrutiny in that context:
objects a and b are relationally similar with regards to property q [Sq (a,
b)]. This does not solely amount to categorizing. In fact, the assertion of
a similarity fact consistently and simultaneously presupposes that a “dissimilarity
fact” can be asserted insofar it is conditional to properties other than q—
i.e., whilst objects a and b are relationally similar with regards to property
q, objects a and b are relationally dissimilar with regards to property w.
The assertion of a similarity fact lacks both the “tunnel-vision” and the
epistemological constructivism of equality. The assertion of a “similarity
fact” does not categorize. As detailed below, the utterance of a similarity
fact—which, in turn, entails a description of a relation of similarity between
a and b—is a necessary, although insufficient, condition for a judgment of
equality. The opposite does not hold. See below:

15. The meaning and function of the “relevance” of properties may even vary in
both descriptive and prescriptive speech of equality. Naturally, to claim that there exists a
prescriptive speech of similarity is nonsensical.
16. I take inspiration from the “focus” referred to in FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE 21 (1991).
17. See Comanducci, supra note 7, at 32.
18. Sustaining that NIETZSCHE and LOCKE understand “similar” as the name given
to the property of sharing some characteristics, before any clear-cut criterion of relevance
has been stated, see Gianformaggio, supra note 6, at 272.
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SIM: Neil Young and Jim Morrison are similar with regards to property “long
hair”; [Slonghair(NY, JM)]
DISSIM: Neil Young and Jim Morrison are dissimilar with regards to property
“place of birth”; [¬Splacebirth(NY, JM)
EQU: Neil Young and Jim Morrison are singers
DIF: Neil Young and Jim Morrison are not fellow countrymen

The analysis of similarity entails a philosophical problem that should
be briefly addressed if one wishes to avoid criticism regarding similarity
facts simply amounting to descriptions of relations of similarity. The
question is twofold: “is the relation of similarity a universal?” and “does
asserting a similarity fact commits the utterer to the platonist existence of
universals?”19 Russell believed so in his famous analysis of the “regress
of similarity” as he affirmed that replacing facts about universals by facts
about similarity is hopeless because one will necessarily conclude that
similarity (or “resemblance” as Russell calls it) will have to be universal:
If we wish to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity, we shall choose
some particular patch of white or some particular triangle, and say that anything
is white or a triangle if it has the right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular.
But then the resemblance required will have to be a universal. Since there are
many white things, the resemblance must hold between many pairs of particular
white things; and this is the characteristic of a universal. It will be useless to say
that there is a different resemblance for each pair, for then we shall have to say
that these resemblances resemble each other, and thus at last we shall be forced
to admit resemblance as a universal. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must
be a true universal. And having been forced to admit this universal, we find that
it is no longer worth while to invent difficult and unplausible theories to avoid
the admission of such universals as whiteness and triangularity.20

Recently Cumpa has sustained a sound neutralist account of similarity
in which he claims that Russell’s “regress of similarity” is a non sequitur
and that a Platonist and universalist account of similarity need not (and
should not) be followed. In his view, what can be inferred from Russell’s
“regress of similarity” is, at best, the existence of the similarity relation between
two or more terms, but “not the additional fact that it has a certain nature,
universal or of other kind.” Cumpa claims that the assertion of a “similarity
fact” simply commits the utterer to two inferences: (i) a “relational
inference” by which “if a stands in similarity relation Sq to b, and c stands
in similarity relation Sq to d, then there is a similarity relation Sq with four
19. This is the “problem of universals” or the “sharing problem” (what is the similarity ground of a’s being q and b’s being q?). According to Cumpa, supra note 9, at 2, a
different problem is the “fundamental tie” or the “having problem” (what is the compositional ground of a’s being q and b’s being q?).
20. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 55 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2d ed. 2001) (1912). A more profound analysis of Russell and Grossman’s view may
be found in Cumpa, supra note 9, at 5 ff.
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terms (and other terms may be added); (ii) a “neutralist inference” by
which “if a stands in similarity relation Sq to b, then there is a similarity
relation, Sq (a, b). The assertion of “similarity facts” ontologically commits
oneself to the existence of similarity relations, but not that such similarity
relations must be universal or of other metaphysical nature.21 Both of
these inferences suffice and there is no need for unreliable metaphysical
commitments.
C. Identity
I take “identity” to mean that two or more objects have in common all
their properties. Describing two or more objects as “identical” means
neither that they merely share some properties, nor that only “relevant
properties” under some standard of evaluation are being considered. It
rather means that they share all their properties or, better said, that they
are but one single object (or term). This is so under the Leibniz law of the
identity of indiscernibles, formalized as (∀ x ∀ y ∀ φ ((φ x → φ y) ⇔
x=y).22 Much differently to what happens in judgments of “equality” in
which—as detailed below—it is judged that a = b (a and b being two
objects), a description of “identity” means that albeit the different name
(x = y as per the logical formalization), it is stated that a = a. See below:
ID: Jim Morrison and “the Lizard King” are identical because they are one and
the same; (φ JimMorrison → φ “LizardKing”) ⇔ JimMorrison = “LizardKing”)

D. Equality
In descriptive speech, I take “equal” to mean that two or more objects
belong to the same class or category, since they share “relevant” properties
according to a given standard of evaluation.23 I am aware of the logical
differences between classes and categories. A “class” is a collection of
sets that can be unambiguously defined by a property that all its members
21. See Cumpa, supra note 9, at 8–9.
22. If placement of objects in spatial context is seen as a relevant property, then no
identity can ever be assigned to two different objects. See Comanducci, supra note 7, at
32. On the principle of identity (as applied to propositions), see DELIA TERESA ECHAVE,
MARIA EUGENIA URQUIJO & RICARDO A. GUIBOURG, LÓGICA, PROPOSICIÓN Y NORMA 83 ff.
(7th ed. 2008).
23. See, for instance, Comanducci, supra note 7, at 33; Ricardo Guastini, La Gramática
de “Igualdad,” in DISTINGUIENDO—ESTUDIOS DE TEORÍA Y METATEORÍA DEL DERECHO
193 (1999); Gianformaggio, supra note 6, at 260.
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share. “Category,” in turn, is a term used with multiple purposes. In its
broader sense, following Strawson, “category” is any type of linguistic
expression, concept, or entity that belongs to a set which is general and
important enough for one to deal with it. 24 I am generally referring to
“category” qua linguistic expression and, despite these conceptual differences,
I am using “categories” and “classes” indistinctively in the text.25
A judgment of equality between two objects entails that they are nonidentical objects, i.e., they are not one and the same. This means not only
that those two objects may be deemed “different” under a standard of
evaluation other than the one under which they were deemed “equal”, but
also that they surely will be deemed “different” under at least one other
standard of evaluation. Why? Because there necessarily is a dissimilarity
fact to be asserted regarding a dissimilarity relation between them, otherwise
they would be identical.26
You have perhaps noticed two relevant aspects in the sentences above.
Firstly, in addressing “identity” I asserted that two or more objects have
in common all their properties, ergo they are identical, whereas in addressing
“equality” I asserted that if two or more objects belong to the same “class”
or “category” then they are judged equal under that standard of evaluation.
As opposed to “identity,” which refers to individuals, equality (as does
similarity) refers to properties shared.27 See below:
EQU1: Jim Morrison and Janis Joplin are singers
EQU2: Jim Morrison and Janis Joplin died at the age of 27
DIF: Jim Morrison is a man and Janis Joplin is a woman

The mere fact that two individuals are comparatively evaluated under the
standard of “age of death” means that they cannot belong to other classes
under the same standard of evaluation.28 This is particularly important as
24. The English word “category” comes from the word “κατηγορία” from Ancient
Greek. In Modern English, it is often used as a synonym of “attribute,” “class,” or “set.”
See Javier Cumpa, Categories, 15 PHIL. COMPASS e12646, 2 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1111/
phc3.12646 [https://perma.cc/88XB-VJ3N]. On the several meanings of “category,” see
PETER FREDERICK STRAWSON, SUBJECT AND PREDICATE IN LOGIC AND GRAMMAR 25 (1974);
ANASTACIO ALEMÁN PARDO, TEORIA DE LAS CATEGORIAS EN LA FILOSOFIA ANALITICA
[THEORY OF CATEGORIES IN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY] 19 (1985).
25. As does SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 18 n.4.
26. Gosepath claims that “[j]udgements of equality presume a difference between
the things compared.” Stephan Gosepath, Equality, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Summer 2021). I believe that may be misleading. A
“judgment of difference” may be performed between the things compared but what a judgment
of equality presumes is a dissimilarity fact between them, which is altogether different.
27. Gianformaggio, supra note 6, at 259.
28. The same does not hold, however, for the standard of evaluation of “role in a
band” (i.e., “singers”) because they may—and indeed did—additionally play instruments
occasionally.
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it shows that a judgment of equality entails partitioning the set of objects
that can be evaluated under such standard into two mutually excluding and
jointly exhaustive classes: (i) the class of objects equal amongst themselves
under a given standard of evaluation (e.g., individuals that died at the age
of 27) and (ii) the class of all remaining objects (e.g., individuals that did
not die at the age of 27).29 Both classes are open, as they are subject to
logical variations in time. For instance, Jimi Hendrix also belongs to the
class of individuals equal amongst themselves under the standard of evaluation
“age of death”, but Leonard Cohen became a member of the class of the
remaining.
A judgment of difference, on the other hand, entails a partition of the
set of objects that can be evaluated under such standard in two mutually
excluding and jointly exhaustive classes: (i) the class of objects different
amongst themselves under a given standard of evaluation (people that died
with different ages) and (ii) the class of all remaining objects (people that
died with the same age). See below:
EQU: Jimi Hendrix, Jim Morrison, and Janis Joplin died at the age of 27
DIFF: Jimi Hendrix and Leonard Cohen died at a different age.

Secondly, you have perhaps noticed that I used the terms “descriptions
of similarity” and “descriptions of identity” whereas I shifted to “judgments
of equality.” This is of paramount importance. It is well known that “descriptive
equality” and “prescriptive equality” are terms used in legal parlance but
the terms “prescriptive identity” or “prescriptive similarity” are not. In
fact, the latter terms are nonsensical. Similarities and identity are always
described, never prescribed. This, however, does not mean to suggest that
“descriptive equality”, as it is generally understood, entails a description
(in the sense of “descriptive activity”) that is identical to the description in
“descriptive identity” or “descriptive similarity”. I am suggesting it does not.
In fact, I am suggesting that “descriptive equality” is an ill-suited term for
representing the underlying intellectual operation it purports to represent.
In descriptive similarity, one aims at asserting a similarity fact between
two objects regarding a given property—e.g., one may bring about issues
of quantitative vagueness in wondering whether the hair of Neil Young
really is as “long” as the hair of Jim Morrison. In descriptive identity, the
questions are whether a global analysis and thorough description was
performed to the full extent over the object and whether the outcome of
29.

See Comanducci, supra note 7, at 33.
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that global analysis entails the proposition that no unshared properties
exist—e.g., one may include psychological data in the analysis and wonder
whether the “Lizard King” is a persona created by Jim Morrison, thus not
really the same.
In descriptive equality, the description of two objects as equal is never
as “pure” as in descriptive identity and descriptive similarity. I do not
mean to say that it is not pure because, epistemologically speaking, all
knowledge is “theory infused” or grounded pro tanto and subject to the
availability bias. Perceptual biases may well impact similarity, identity, or
equality alike. What I mean to say is that, contrary to descriptive identity and
descriptive similarity, descriptive equality does not address reality wholly
and directly. Rather it denotes a scent of constructive epistemology. And by
stating this I do not want to dabble into the foundations of constructivism, rather
I simply mean to convey that “descriptive equality” entails “categorizing”
while the latter involves recreating the objects of the world (the datum) through
cognition and systematization which in turn allows for the understanding the
world as a meaningful whole (sinnvolles Ganzes).30
I have mentioned above that a judgment of equality entails establishing
or instituting a and b as equal. Establishing a and b as equal amounts to
categorizing, something that presupposes yet goes beyond describing similarities
between a and b – i.e., asserting that similarity fact. Categorizing brings
about the issue of the “propositional function” as a logical method for the
determination of categories. According to Russell, a propositional function,
devised as φ (x), has two main components: “variables” (x) and “ranges
of significance” (the class of values of x), which make possible the
formation of categories φ. Russell asserts that “ranges of significance
form types, i.e., if x belongs to the range of significance of φ(x), then there
is a class of objects, the type of x, all of which must also belong to the range
of significance of φ(x).”31
“Forming” categories therefore may be seen as a two-step process that
includes (i) establishing the range of significance of φ (x) and (ii) including x in the range of significance of φ (x). See below:
SIM: Neil Young and Jim Morrison are similar with regards to property of
“singing”
EQU: Neil Young and Jim Morrison are “singers” in the sense that:

30. I borrow the expression “constructive epistemology” from HANS KELSEN, REINE
RECHTSLEHRE [PURE THEORY OF LAW] 81 (Max Knight trans., 2d rev. ed. 2005) (1960).
31. BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PRINCIPLE OF MATHEMATICS app. B (1964). The notion of
“category” is purely linguistic, according to Gilbert Ryle, Categories, 38 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 189, 192 (1938). See also Cumpa, supra note 24, at 2 ff.
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(i)

If there is a range of significance of “φ(singers)”, then there is a class of
objects, the type of “singers” all of which also belong to the range of
significance of “φ(singers)”
(ii) Neil Young and Jim Morrison are particulars that belong to that class of
objects, the type of “singers”

1. “Declaring” Equality
Comanducci rightfully claims that a judgment of equality in descriptive
contexts entails “setting up (in Spanish “instaurar”) a relation of equivalence
[between two objects] that does not account for differentiating characteristics.”32
Russell, in turn, alluded to the “formation” of categories. You will note
that “setting up”, “establishing” or “instituting” is somehow constitutive, not
descriptive: it is a type of decision-making.33 Furthermore, the illocutionary
force of “setting up,” “establishing,” or “instituting” is not assertive, but
declarative: it entails a performative effect.34
Assertive speech acts are unidirectional speech acts in the direction of
fit: word-to-world. Success of fit in assertive speech acts is attained iff the
segment of reality is represented faithfully in such a manner that what is
asserted corresponds to reality. Declarative speech acts are bidirectional
speech acts in the direction of fit: word-to-world and world-to-word. They
conform reality in accordance with what was said, and present reality
altered in such a way. As Searle claims, “it is the defining characteristic
of this class that the successful performance of one of its members brings
about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality,
successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds
to the world: If I successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman,
then you are chairman.”35 Naturally, this is conditional on the individual
having an active disposition—i.e., a power—to do just that.

32. Comanducci, supra note 7, at 32.
33. It is stated that “categorization, the study of generalizable representations, is a
type of decision making, and that categorization learning research would benefit from approaches
developed to study the neuroscience of decision making.” See Carol A. Seger & Erik J.
Peterson, Abstract, Categorization = Decision Making + Generalization, 37 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 1187 (2013).
34. See JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
66–67 (1969).
35. See John R. Searle, A Classification of Illocutionary Acts, 5 LANGUAGE IN
SOC’Y 1, 13 (1976); Frank A. Hindriks, The New Role of the Constitutive Rule, 62 AM. J.
ECON. & SOCIO. 185, 192 (2003).
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In creating the category “singers” – and suppose I do it for the first time
—I perceive as a result Neil Young and Jim Morrison not just as
particulars, or even as particulars with a similarity relation with regards to
property q. Quite differently, I perceive them and they present themselves
as “particular x’s, being instances or tokens of more encompassing
categories.”36 Note the different illocutionary force in the two following
sentences:
SIM: “Neil Young and Jim Morrison are singers”
means
“Neil Young and Jim Morrison are similar with regards to property of
“singing”
Action: assertion of similarity fact
Speech act: assertive
EQU: “Neil Young and Jim Morrison are “singers”
means
(i) if there is a range of significance of “φ(singers)”, then there is a class
of objects, the type of “singers” all of which also belong to the range of
significance of “φ(singers)”; (ii) Neil Young and Jim Morrison belong to
that class of objects, the type of “singers.”
Action: Establishment, setting-up or institution of equivalence
Speech act: declarative

“Equality” is therefore declared, not described. Henceforth all references
made to “descriptive equality” will be made solely on the basis of that
terminology being used and in force in literature and to avoid terminological
inconsistency. However, those references should be read as “declared
equality.”
2. “Declared Equality” and the Rule of the Category
“Declared equality” necessarily entails a filter of relevant properties
previously selected under a criterion or meta-factor. In establishing the
equivalence, declared equality presupposes abiding by a rule—usually
dubbed the “standard of evaluation,” “meta-factor,” or “criterion.” I shall
call this rule the “rule of the category” (RuleCatg). Descriptive similarity
and descriptive identity presuppose no such RuleCatg.
The RuleCatg does not merely set out the relevant properties under
comparison and the discarding of all the other (irrelevant) properties. It
prescribes which properties are to be deemed relevant and governs the
action of establishing, instituting or setting-up equality or difference. It is
such a RuleCatg that prescribes that, in considering properties of “Neil

36.
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Young” and “Jim Morrison” to create a category of “singers” and include
these particulars as members to that category, one ought (O) to consider
only whether they sing professionally. The “ought” in the RuleCatg is deontic,
hence the rule. Evidently, the RuleCatg may also be read, under the
interdefinability of deontic modes, that in considering properties of “Neil
Young” and “Jim Morrison”, one ought not (F) to consider properties
other than whether they sing professionally. The RuleCatg functions as an
exclusionary reason that unburdens the decision-maker in comparison and
class-creation: Jim Morrison and Janis Joplin ought to be deemed equal
based on the RuleCatg “age of death” and one is forbidden to account, for
example, that Janis had a much better voice.37 Janis’ voice is normatively
irrelevant under the RuleCatg “age of death.” See below:
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37. On rules as “exclusionary reasons” see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND
NORMS 35 ff. (3d ed. 1999). See also Larry Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, 18
PHIL. TOPICS 5 (1990).
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It has been stated by neuroscientists that definitions of decision-making
and categorization are similar up to the point that only categorization
works on generalizable representations. In fact, generalization is said to
be the key distinction between decision-making and categorization.38
Generalizations presuppose two main things: a set of particulars and
one or more shared properties deemed common to such particulars. One
can say that for every two related concepts, a and b, a is a generalization
of b if and only iff each instantiation of concept b is also an instantiation
of concept a and if there are instantiations of concept a which are not
instantiations of concept b: say a = mammals and b = bats. In view of this,
the issue boils down yet again to the selection of relevant properties
for the purpose of generalizing.
As described by Schauer, much like what is stated in addressing “declared
equality”, generalizations do not negate the existence of dissimilar properties
of particulars included in a category; rather, they suppress the existence
of such dissimilar properties within the context of the generalization.39
Schauer adequately describes generalizations as purporting to “selective
inclusions” and “selective exclusions.” Borrowing the expression of Alchourrón
and Bulygin, I claim that the RuleCatg in “declared equality” entails putting
forward a thesis of relevance of “similar-properties” (e.g., whether Jim
Morrison and Neil Young both sing professionally) which is necessarily
accompanied by putting forward a thesis of irrelevance of “dissimilarproperties” between particulars (e.g., whether Jim Morrison and Neil Young
share a birthplace).40 I hope to show below that this is quite relevant for
the use of “equality” in prescriptive contexts.
III. PRESCRIPTIVE EQUALITY AND THE CHIMAERA OF
“OPTIMAL INCLUSIVENESS”
A. Introduction: Some Ambiguities of “Prescriptive Equality”
Notwithstanding the several ramifications pertaining to the application
of prescriptive equality—which largely fall outside the scope of this essay
—nobody denies that equality prescribes that one “ought to treat equals
equally.”41 There are, however, many ambiguities surrounding the “core”
of the prescriptive concept of equality. For instance, irrespective of his
38. Seger & Peterson, supra note 33, at 1189.
39. Compare SCHAUER , supra note 16, at 21–22 (referring to “suppression” of
differences) and Comanducci, supra note 7, at 32 (referring to “abstracting” from differences).
40. See C ARLOS E. ALCHOURRÓN & E UGENIO B ULYGIN , INTRODUCCIÓN A LA
METODOLOGÍA DE LAS CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS Y SOCIALES 153 ff. (2006); RATTI, supra note
13, at 61ff.
41. Comanducci, supra note 7, at 36.
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illuminating clarity in other features of the concept, Comanducci claims
that the concept of equality in prescriptive contexts is “the concept through
which it is prescribed, or constructed, a comparative relation between two
or more objects, two or more actions and two or more circumstances.”42
The question then arises: what is specifically the difference between the
“setting up” of a relation of equivalence between two objects—that
Comanducci alludes to in descriptive contexts—and the “construction” of
a comparative relation between two objects in prescriptive contexts?43
And what exactly is meant with the prescription of a comparative relation?
And how can it be, analytically, that a single “norm”—that of equality—
simultaneously “prescribes” (i) a comparative relation and (ii) that one
“ought to treat equals equally”? And could the same “norm” prescribe
that equals ought to be treated equally and differents ought to be treated
differently?
First, it seems odd that “prescriptive equality” simultaneously “prescribes”
and “constructs” a comparison. In fact, the “construction” of the category
through comparison and joint measurement is a feature of the so-called
“descriptive equality,” which amounts to “declared equality.” Categorization is
a necessary, although insufficient, condition for the prescription of “equal
treatment.” Westen claims—though he bypasses the “declarative speech
act” in the “descriptive equality” (i.e., “declared equality”) and uses “identically”
with the technical meaning of “equally”—that “one cannot say that a
particular group of persons deserve identical treatment unless one is able
to distinguish those who are members of the group from those who are not.
And, second, one cannot identify particular persons as members of a group
without possessing a descriptive standard which specifies the features that
together characterize them as members.”44 I believe that, in saying so,
Westen is simply referring to the precondition of “categorization” for
prescriptive equality. And, save for the terminological distinctions which
carry relevant underlying importance, I fully agree.
Second, “treating” equals equally and “comparing” are two non-identical
and independent actions. When one compares a and b such action does
not entail that one treats a and b equally; and if x treats a and b equally
does not mean that x compared a and b: she may as well have been told
42. Id. at 34.
43. Comanducci claims that, in “descriptive equality,” a “relation of equivalence is
set-up [in Spanish, “instaurada”].” Id.
44. PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE
OF ‘EQUALITY’ IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 66 (1990).
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or ordered to do so. I suggest that it cannot be so that a single norm—that
of “equality”—governs two independent actions simultaneously. Sound
“individuation criteria” for legal norms sets forth that two actions cannot
—even if represented by one single provision—be governed by one and
the same norm.45 And it really does not matter whether the prescription of
“treating equals equally” by “prescriptive equality” presupposes comparison
and, or, categorization. That only means that a category-product (and not
the action of “categorization”) is the descriptive component or operative
fact of the norm of equality. The prescription of comparison and categorization
—assuming there is a prescription and not merely a “necessity” to do so
—must, therefore, arise from somewhere else.
Before moving forward with the tentative answer to these questions, I
must lay down some relevant preconceptions on “equation” and
“differentiation.” I hope these preconceptions prove worthy for the
conclusions to be drawn afterwards.
B. “We are Men, Not Gods”: The Risks of Legislating and the
Risks of “Equating”
In claiming that “the law must predominantly, but by no means exclusively,
refer to classes of persons, and to classes of acts, things and circumstances,”
H.L.A. Hart famously adverted that one cannot foresee all the possible
combinations of circumstances that may arise in the future, while
simultaneously noticing the two main handicaps in lawmaking: relative
ignorance of fact and relative indeterminacy of aim. 46 One who lacks
omniscience and seeks to regulate behavior in advance by means of
general standards has no control over neither the unforeseen particulars
that may enter, in future applications, the “open classes” one created, nor
over the purpose and direction which will govern the application of such
regulations to particular occasions. These handicaps arise from one being
fated to resort to “fresh choices between open alternatives” since, as
magnificently put by Hart, “. . .the necessity of such choice[s] is thrust
upon us because we are men, not gods. It is a feature of the human
predicament (and so of the legislative one).”47
One could simplistically sum it up in the following: p1: generalizing
and categorizing is a risk because it is rooted in inductive reasoning; p2:
legislating is (partly) generalizing and categorizing, because, as stated,
45. On norm individuation, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 70–92 (2d ed. 2003).
46. And I stress that Hart refers to “must” [refer to classes] as in alethic necessity,
not “ought” [refer to classes] as in deontic obligation. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994).
47. Id.
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“the law predominantly (. . .) refers to classes of persons, and to classes
of acts, things and circumstances”; c: legislating is (partly) a risk.48
1. Legal Norms as “Relevance-Sorters”
Legal norms are generally understood to apply to a universal open class
of subjects [i.e., for all x (= ∀ x), a class which is subject to logical variations
in time].49 Statutes may refer to particulars through “legislative decisions”
but norms, which are the common content of statutes, may not.50 As Hart
anticipated, categorization transcends the universe of addressees and spreads
through the remaining components of norms: action-types and occasiontypes (in hartian terms: “circumstances”) are also classes and include all
the tokens that instantiate such classes.51
Within the analytical view, norms are deontic units generally broken
down into three components: the norm-antecedent (fattispecies, protasis),
the deontic operator, and the norm-consequent (apodosis). Setting aside
the deontic operator (P, F or O), irrelevant for the present purpose:
(1) the norm-antecedent is the descriptive component of norms,
further divided subcomponents (ia) class of addressees, (ib)
hypothetical action-types, and (ic) hypothetical types of states
of affairs, i.e., occasion-types.
(2) the norm-consequent signifies a deontic reduction of the set
of possibilities within the opportunities described in the antecedent
[e.g., within the opportunities to do q1, q2, or q3 in scenario p,
addressees are obligated to do q2];52
(3) for instance, in “when driving one should drink moderately”,
the class of addressees is universal (= all), “driving” is the

48. SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 18 ff.; Pedro Moniz Lopes, The Syntax of Principles:
Genericity as a Logical Distinction Between Rules and Principles, 30 RATIO JURIS 471,
474 ff. (2017).
49. ALF ROSS, DIRECTIVES AND NORMS 109–10 (1968).
50. The fact that statutes may refer to particulars is the plausible justification for
Hart’s carve-out: “the law must predominantly, but by no means exclusively, refer to
classes of person, and to classes of acts, things and circumstances”.
51. See EUGENIO BULYGIN & DANIEL MENDONCA, NORMAS Y SISTEMAS NORMATIVOS 16
(2005).
52. On the opportunity to perform the “norm-content” as a logical condition of norms
(e.g., in “the door ought to be shut at all times” requires the existence of a door and it being
open), see GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, NORM AND ACTION 71 ff., 74–75 (1963); ROSS,
supra note 50, at 108.
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occasion-type, “drinking” is the action-type and “moderately”
represents the deontic reduction of the set of possibilities
within the opportunities described in the antecedent, ranging
from having a “sip” (q1) to drinking the “most amount of alcohol
factually possible” (qn); say, for instance, that “up to (q10)”
meets the quantitatively vague criterion of “moderate” drinking.
Bearing this in mind, I shall now focus on highlighting one invariant of
the antecedent of any norm: the “differentiation” implied in “equating”
dissimilar things through legislation. It is said that “to equate different
things is the real task of the legislator”53 I shall borrow this sentence from
Gianformaggio but wish to add up to it and claim that in equating different
things, the lawmaker necessarily differentiates. This is by no means paradoxical.
What I mean to convey is that from a set of particulars (a, b, c, d. . . n) the
lawmaker establishes an equivalence between (a, b, c), thus forming
“category x”, the members of which are a, b, c. But, in doing so, the
formation of this category necessarily leaves out particulars d to n. “Equation”
between a, b, c occurs in forming “category x” but “differentiation” occurs
between members of “category x” and members of “category non-x”. In
other words, in creating a norm, the lawmaker “declares” members of
“category x” to be normatively relevant whilst simultaneously declaring
members of “category non-x” to be irrelevant vis-à-vis the norm created.
Relevance was defined above as a predicate of a property of a particular,
that which denotes the relation of a property of a particular with a standard
of relevance. “Legal relevance” is a sub-type of relevance. It is but a predicate
of a property of a particular that denotes the relation of such property with
a given legal system: a property of a particular is said to be relevant iff
when contrasted with a given legal system, that property of that particular
instantiates a hypothetical property represented in it.54 Law is a human
artifact and lawmakers “construct” the legal system. This means that lawmakers
“construct” the standard of relevance.
I suppose I am claiming something similar to what Comanducci claims
when he asserts that legal norms institute a “class of equals” (the addressees
of the norm) and a “class of differents” (those to which the norm does not
apply, i.e., the “non-addressees” of the norm).55 But Comanducci’s explanation

53. Gianformaggio, supra note 6, at 271. Stating that “to legislate is to distinguish
and, in a certain sense, to discriminate,” see Guastini, supra note 23, at 194.
54. ALCHOURRÓN & BULYGIN, supra note 40, at 152; Yovel, supra note 13, at 309.
Sustaining that “relevance” is a predicate of properties, conceived as the operative conditions
of legal norms, see RATTI 2013: 61.
55. Comanducci, supra note 7, at 36.
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seems to fall short with regards to norm components.56 In fact, “classes of
equals” and “classes of differents” are formed with regards to all norm
components, not only addressees. One can envisage:
(1) inside the standard of relevance several “classes of addresses,”
“classes of hypothetical action-types,” and “classes of occasions,”
those which are equal under that standard of relevance; and
(2) outside the standard of relevance several “classes of nonaddresses,” “classes of non-hypothetical action-types,” and
“classes of non-occasions,” those which are equal different
under that standard of relevance.
For instance, a norm statement that reads “no dogs allowed in the restaurant”
assigns the deontic status F to relevant action-type “entering in the restaurant”
in the relevant occasion “with dogs” (NORM1).57 NORM1 does not specify
any addressee (i.e., it applies to all persons, not only “clients” or “dogowners”), therefore there is no “classes of non-addresses.”58 However, NORM1
awards relevance to both action-tokens subsumed to action-types “entering
in the restaurant” (i.e., all action-tokens included in the class of action-types
“entering in the restaurant”) and circumstances subsumed in the occasion
“with dogs” (i.e., all circumstances included in the class of occasions “with
dogs”).59 In fact, NORM1 awards isolated contributive relevance and joint
sufficient relevance to those specific action-tokens and circumstances.
Simultaneously, NORM1 awards sufficient irrelevance, for instance, to
action-tokens subsumed to action-types “passing by the restaurant” and
circumstances subsumed in the occasion “smoking a cigarette.” Action56. The same cannot be said of Guastini as, although he does not elaborate, he states
that “to say that two operative facts are equal is not different to say that they are equal in
all elements that they are comprised of.” Guastini, supra note 23, at 193.
57. I am borrowing Schauer’s well known example of Angus, the black Terrier. See
SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 18 ff.
58. I am purposedly avoiding the discussion over “scope of the norm” in terms of
geography or time. In any case, I believe that has more to do with scope of competence
norms and occasion of the norm itself than with addressees.
59. Whether or not the norm awards relevance to entering with a cat is a matter of
it implying a strict biconditional. If it is read “iff (dogs) then F(enter)” it most certainly
awards irrelevance to entering with cats. It is read “if (dogs) then F(enter)”, it is a matter
of whether the norm is exemplary to an underlying principle according to which
“no disturbing animals allowed in the restaurant.” See J. Garcia Amado, Sobre el
Argumento a Contrario en la Aplicación del Derecho, 24 DOXA 85 (2001); Adrian Rentería
Diaz, Silogismo Jurídico, Argumento “A Contrario” y Reglas Constituvitas, 20 DOXA 317,
325–26 (1997).
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types “passing by the restaurant” and circumstances subsumed in the occasion
“smoking a cigarette” are respectively members of “classes of non-hypothetical
action-types” and “classes of non-occasions” vis-à-vis NORM1.
Norms sort out the relevance of addressees, action-types and occasions.
I shall call this characteristic of norms that of being “relevance-sorters.”
2. Causal Relevance and Descriptive (or “Declared”) Relevance
Alchourrón and Bulygin magnifically expounded, in Normative Systems,
two types of properties when it comes to their relevance vis-à-vis a given
legal system: “descriptive relevance” and “prescriptive relevance.” The
descriptive relevance of a property in connection with a norm or a set of
norms is obtained iff (i) some norm or norms of the legal system represents
such property in the antecedent and (ii) that property (x) and its complementary
property (¬ x) are assigned different deontic status—i.e., if the legal system
correlates the existence of such property and its negation with different
normative solutions. A given property will be prescriptively relevant, in
turn, if, from an external evaluative viewpoint, one concludes that such
property (x) and its complementary property (¬ x) should have been
assigned—regardless of that not being the case—different deontic status.60
It should be noted that both “descriptive relevance” and “prescriptive
relevance” allude to the viewpoint of the observer. In the former case, the
observer is describing relevant properties from inside the legal system
(i.e., the standard of relevance) whilst in the latter he is prescribing relevance
from outside the legal system, by contrasting one standard of relevance
(i.e., the legal system) with an external standard of relevance (e.g., a moral
evaluative standard or a standard of efficiency).
Lawmakers, however, do not describe nor prescribe relevant properties:
they rather prescribe actions and “declare” relevant properties. When enacting
a legal provision, the lawmaker is not prescribing relevance; she is not
stating that property x ought to be relevant. She is stating that property x
“is” relevant, therefore legal consequences apply to whenever property x
arises in a case.
But why and how is that relevance declared by lawmakers? “Classcreation”—which includes creation of “class of x” and “class of non x”,
as described above—gives rise to the “justification problem.” The justification
problem arises whenever a class is created, whether in the context of “rulecreation” or in the context of analogical reasoning.61 In fact, there is no
60. ALCHOURRÓN & BULYGIN, supra note 40, at 152.
61. I am using “analogical reasoning” as in Todd R. Davies, Determination, Uniformity,
and Relevance: Normative Criteria for Generalization and Reasoning by Analogy, in
ANALOGICAL REASONING: PERSPECTIVES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE SCIENCE,
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difference in the sorting of relevance in each of these intellectual operations:
one cannot analogically sustain any two cases are “relevantly equal” (note
that some authors use “relevantly similar”) without presupposing a RuleCatg
anymore than we can formulate a rule of decision for a series of cases
without such rule.62
The justification problem may be defined as follows: one shall find a
criterion which, if satisfied by any particular analogical inference, sufficiently
establishes the truth of the projected conclusion from “potential member
1” of the category to “potential member 2” of the potential category. In
analogical reasoning, the finding of such criterion implies specifying relevant
background knowledge that, “when added to the premises of the analogy,
makes the conclusion follow soundly.”63 The same happens with the
generalizations entailed in the formation of categories in prescriptive
contexts.
Under the “bottom-up” methodological account for legislating, regulating
behavior by means of general standards is twofold: “problem-solving” and
“target-oriented.”64 Therefore, it entails generalizing from those specific
and particular cases (i.e., persons, actions and occasions) that triggered the
“problem” and presented it in the agenda of lawmakers in the first place. As
stated above, the criterion for categorizing is conventional (there are no
necessary categories). This hints at the basic tenet of lawmaking and
regulating behavior: as “problem-solving” and “target-oriented” general
standards of conduct, norms should include all subjects and occasions
(target-oriented) and hypothetical actions (problem-solving) that share

PHILOSOPHY 227, 228 ff. (D.H. Helman ed., 1988). The definition is the following:
“[the] process of inferring that a conclusion property Q holds of a particular situation or
object T (the target) from the fact that T shares a property or set of properties P with another
situation/object S (the source) which has property Q. The set of common properties P is
the similarity between S and T, and the conclusion property Q is projected from S onto T”.
See also Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet, The A Simili Argument: An Inferentialist
Setting, 22 RATIO JURIS 499, 499 ff (2009).
62. PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE
OF ‘EQUALITY’ IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 220 (1990); Gianformaggio, supra note
6, at 255 ff.
63. Davies, supra note 61, at 230. Davies divides the justification problem into two
steps: (1) From the first premise P (S) ∧ Q (S), conclude the generalization ∀ x (x) ⇒ Q(x)
and (2) instantiate the generalization to T and apply modus ponens to get the conclusion
Q (T).
64. On the “bottom-up” methodological account for legislating, see RAZ, supra note
37, at 187; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 933 (2006).
AND
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the properties of those particulars (persons, actions and occasions) which
triggered the “problem” and demanded for the assignment of a deontic status
in the first place. Note, again, that the “equation” in lawmaking is similar
to the one in analogical reasoning. As Holyoak shows, what really controls
“analogical matching” is the search for goal-relevant predicates and relations
that enter into systematic structures of the lawmaker: “typically (. . .) predicates
as ‘causes,’ ‘implies,’ and ‘depends on,’ that is, causal elements that are
pragmatically important to goal attainment.”65
The key concept here is, therefore, “causal relevance.” As defined by
Schauer, “causal relevance” is the underlying justification of the prescription
of the goal, or proscription of the evil, that the lawmakers intend to procure
by relying on relevant background knowledge over previous particular
cases.66 When formulating the norm statement “no dogs allowed in the
restaurant,” the restaurant owner is availing himself of the background
knowledge regarding the disarray created by Angus, a black Scottish Terrier.
In enacting that norm, the lawmaker generalizes from Angus to the class
of “dogs” of which Angus is a member. And in doing so, the lawmaker
is presupposing that it is the property of “dogness”—and not, for instance,
that of “blackness”—that was cause to the consequence of the disarray at
the restaurant. Normative relevance of “dogness” presupposes practical
causation.67 If read as a biconditional that enables a contrario, the presupposition
is that only members of the class of “dogs” are cause to the consequence
of “disarray” and, therefore, members of the class of “non-dogs” are no cause
to the consequence of “disarray.”
Causal relevance is, therefore, the cause of declared relevance since it
is the reason why occasion “with dogs” is foreseen in the norm antecedent
of NORM1. In view of the previous presupposition, action type “entering
into the restaurant” together with the occasion “with dogs” is relevant for
the assignment of deontic status F. Note, however, that there is no restriction
of the class of addressees. This is because a potential restriction of the
class of addressees to “clients” would have no impact, in projected hindsight,
to the state of affairs the lawmaker aims at obtaining or preventing. Both
the class of clients and the class of “non-clients” (e.g., including suppliers,
staff, bystanders looking for information, etc.), if accompanied with dogs,

65. See Keith J. Holyoak, The Pragmatics of Analogical Transfer, in 19 THE PSYCHOLOGY
LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 59, 75–76 (G. H. Bower ed., 1985). Critically, claiming
Holyoak goes too far and that “though one may sympathize with the desire to take plans
and goals into account, discounting structure is the wrong way to go about it”, see D.
Gentner, The Mechanisms of Analogical Learning, in SIMILARITY AND ANALOGICAL REASONING
199, 220 (S. Vosniadu & A. Ortony eds., 1989: 220).
66. SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 25.
67. Yovel, supra note 13, at 300.
OF
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are equal cause to the disarray at the restaurant. “Non-clients” are declared
equal to clients vis-à-vis NORM1.
3. Relevance and Defeasibility: We Are Liable to Differentiate
“Declared Equals”
As stated above, categorization does not negate the existence of dissimilarities
between particulars included in a category, rather it suppresses or disregards
the existence of such dissimilar properties within the context of the
generalization68 This alone largely explains normative defeasibility as
arising with the attribution of hypothetical relevance of a differentiating
property in “time T2,” precisely that property which was ex ante disregarded
as irrelevant in “time T1,” as the “equation of categorization” entailed in the
creation of a given norm took place.69
Defeasibility is a universal dispositional property used to describe norms
as “context-sensitive” both factually and legally. 70 The factual context
surrounding the application of a given normx may vary and the relevant
properties of the case may instantiate conflicting norms 71 Under these
standards, neither principles nor rules can never be deemed in the abstract
to be definitive commands. No norm, regardless of its content or importance,
can define solely by itself its own conditions of all things considered application.72
The definitive character of any normx is subject to the strengthening of the
antecedent which, at best, can only be achieved through the epistemic
proposition that no relevant conflicting and prevailing norms are instantiated
by the properties of the case. In other words, the mere fact that norm x is

68. SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 22; Comanducci, supra note 7, at 32.
69. On normative defeasibility, among many, Juan Carlos Bayón, Why is Legal
Reasoning Defeasible, PLURALISM AND LAW 327ff (Arend Soeteman ed., Kluwer Academic
Publishers 2001); Giovanni Santor, Defensibility in Legal Reasoning, in INFORMATICS AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL REASONING 119 e ss (Zenon Bankowski, Ian White, & Ulrike
Hahn eds., Springer Science & Business Media Dordrecht 1995).
70. Pedro Moniz Lopes, The Syntax of Principles: Genericity as a Logical Distinction
Between Rules and Principles, 30 RATIO JURIS 471, 475 (2017).
71. The concept of conflict I am using is that of “normative contradiction” as devised in
PABLO E. NAVARRO & JORGE L. RODRÍGUEZ, DEONTIC LOGIC AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 178 (2014):
“a logical impossibility for a subject jointly to satisfy the deontic contents of every
mandatory norm together with each of the deontic contents of every permissive norm of a
system of norms enacted by a certain authority and in relation to a certain occasion.”
72. H.L.A. Hart, Essay 3: Problems of the Philosophy of Law, in E SSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 106 (1983).
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internally applicable, pursuant to the instantiation of its antecedent, is no
credential that it will ultimately be applied and govern the case at hand.73
“Defeasibility” is therefore the passive disposition of a norm to enter
into conflicts and, though internally applicable to a case, ultimately not be
applied.74 The application of normx to a case will necessarily depend upon:
(1) the properties of the case instantiating normx and no other
norm of the relevant legal system or;
(2) the properties of the case instantiating normx and other norms
of the legal system that corroborate the consequent of normx
(in which case either normx or the other norms are applicable,
but the consequent is identical) or;
(3) the properties of the instantiating normx and other conflicting
norms of the legal system and secondary norms of the “conflictsolver” type—like lex specialis or lex superior—operate as
external applicators and single out normx as applicable or;
(4) the properties of the instantiating normx and other conflicting
norms of the legal system and, with no applicable “conflictsolver”, the outcome of a balancing between the conflicting
norms operates as external applicator and points out to the
application of normx.
Now, defeasibility is fundamentally a matter of “declared relevance.”
When formulating norm statement “no dogs allowed in the restaurant,”
the restaurant owner availed himself of the background knowledge regarding
the disarray created by Angus, the black Scottish Terrier. By declaring all
dogs “equal” for the purpose of relevantly causing the disarray, the scope
of NORM1 created by the restaurant owner is also including Barnaby—
let us suppose, a nice and well-behaved Labrador. The restaurant owner
declared all dogs to be “equal”—as in equal causation to the consequence
of disarray—thus declaring all dogs to be “equally relevant.” In making
the case that he should be allowed to enter the restaurant with Barnaby,
the well-behaved Labrador, the owner of Barnaby is required to make an
additional “allegation of relevance” regarding either himself, his actiontoken or the circumstance of entering “with Barnaby.”75
Most likely the owner would make an allegation of relevance regarding
the occasion: Barnaby’s “well-behavedness” should be good enough reason

73. Lopes, supra note 70, at 475.
74. Internal defeasibility is therefore nonsensical. Norms are defeasible to the extent they are necessarily liable to conflict with other norms and potentially not govern the
case that instantiates the antecedent. See id. at 474.
75. One could try to see it the other way around, with “allegations of irrelevance.”
I hope to make clear in the text the reason why “allegations of relevance” is much sounder.
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for Barnaby to enter the restaurant along with its owner. Borrowing Alchourrón
and Bulygin’s concepts once again, whenever (i) there is, at least, one property
that, in light of a given standard of relevance all things considered, should
have been deemed relevant by the normative authority when enacting a
given norm and (ii) such property is not foreseen in the antecedent of that
norm, it is said that the universe of addressees, action-types, or occasions
that correspond to the hypothesis of relevance are larger than the universe
of either addressees, action-types or occasions that correspond to the
thesis of relevance.76
But here is the gist: Barbaby’s “well-behavedness” is most likely not
relevant vis-à-vis the applicable legal system. Conversely, the hypothesis
of relevance does not hold. In arguing for the hypothesis of relevance of
Barnaby’s “well-behavedness,” most likely—though it entirely depends
upon the relevant legal system—the owner will not succeed, as he is prescribing
relevance through an external evaluative judgment. The owner of Barnaby
would fail to see the difference in Bentham’s partition between expository
jurisprudence (de lege lata) and censorial jurisprudence (de lege ferenda).77
The allegation of relevance of Barbaby’s “well-behavedness” by its
owner is equivalent to the allegation that NORM1 is over-inclusive: it
should leave Barnaby, the well-behaved Labrador, out of its scope. But
over-inclusiveness may only be argued whenever the norm encompasses
some addressees, action-tokens or occasions (whichever applicable) that,
on the one hand, do not instantiate its underlying justification—i.e., suppose
the principle of not “harming” the peacefulness of the clients—and, on the
other, instantiate the antecedent of a norm that assigns the opposite deontic

76. ALCHOURRÓN AND BULYGIN, supra note 40, at 153 ff.
77. Bentham claims that “[a] book of jurisprudence can have but one or the other
of two objects: 1. to ascertain what the law is; 2. to ascertain what it ought to be. In the
former case it may be styled a book of expository jurisprudence; in the latter, a book of
censorial jurisprudence: or, in other words, a book on the art of legislation.” See JEREMY
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 293 ff (J.H.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996). The distinction between expository jurisprudence and
censorial jurisprudence means “crossing a theoretically significant dividing line: between
the legal positivist’s insistence on doing theory in a morally neutral way and the Natural
Law theorist’s assertion that moral evaluation is an integral part of proper description and
analysis”. See Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory in Dennis Patterson, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 218 (Dennis Patterson ed., Blackwell Publishing,
Ltd. 2d ed. 2010).
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status (F, P).78/79 Barnaby’s owner has no credential over declaring Barnaby
“different” because Barnaby was declared “equal” by the legitimate lawmaker.
Let us now look at the case of Cassius, a guide dog for the blind. The
owner of Cassius can make a reasonable allegation if he wishes to enter the
restaurant with Cassius: (i) the owner is blind; (ii) Cassius is a guide dog,
thus the only means for the owner to enter the restaurant. “Persons with
good vision” and “blind persons” were declared “equal” by the restaurant
norm, as were “guide dogs” and “non-guide dogs.” Cassius’s owner should
not focus on Cassius being well-behaved—though that is usually the case
with guide dogs, that is normatively irrelevant. Nor should he focus on
carving out exceptions on the norm that forbids entry with dogs tout court.
Exceptions are not carved-out from inside the norm, rather from “normative
defeaters” that lie outside that norm. To make a case, Cassius’s owner is
required to make an allegation of relevance of the property of him being
“blind” and walking with a “guide dog” vis-à-vis other norms of the legal
system, that is, norms that conflict with the restaurant prohibition. He may
do so by claiming that an applicable constitutional norm—if there is one
—grants all persons the freedom of movement or foresees specific consumer
rights. Such norms do not explicitly describe the relevance of “blindness”
or “guide dogs” in the antecedent; but they do so implicitly. See below:
(1) The norm (NORM1) that forbids entering the restaurant with dogs
has the logical formalization ∀x x(EnterRest) ∧ x(WithDog) ⇒ F
x(EnterRest), that is, “for all x, if there is an opportunity to enter the
restaurant with dogs, then one ought not to enter restaurants with
dogs”;

78. The meaning I ascribe to generic actions is similar—although not identical—to
the meaning ascribed by Raz to “highly unspecific acts”. See Lopes, supra note 70, at 476.
Raz claims that, since highly unspecific acts can be carried out by means of a variety of more
specific acts on different occasions, the opportunities for performing such acts encompass
the opportunities for performing the more specific acts are therefore more general than the
specific acts. Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 836–
38 (1972).
79. On the contrary, it is said that a norm is “under-inclusive” when (i) certain legal
cases are not subsumed to the conditions of the antecedent of a norm (ii) which governs
cases similar to the class of cases at hand and (iii) the case at hand, though it does not
trigger the norm, instantiates the underlying justification to such norm. In other words,
when there is at least one property that, considering a given standard of relevance all things
considered, should not have been relevant for the legal solution of the case but indeed is
relevant vis-à-vis the under-inclusive norm, thus excluding its immediate application, it is
said that the universe of cases corresponding to the hypothesis of relevance is narrower
than the universe of cases corresponding to the thesis of relevance. In normative underinclusion, the lawmaker introduced too many relevant properties in the antecedent—i.e.,
too many distinctions and different deontic status for each distinguished property.
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(2) The constitutional norm (NORM2) that grants all consumers the
right to access commercial goods has the logical formalization ∀x
x(consumers) ∧ x(AccessingCommercial Goods) ∧ x(AnyCircunstance) ⇒
P x(AccessingCommercial Goods), that is, “for all x, if x is a
consumer and if there is an opportunity to access commercial goods,
then one has the permission to access them”;
(3) The constitutional norm referred to in (ii) grants a “claim-right”, the
correlative of which is a directed duty80: a duty directed to tradesmen.
The constitutional directed duty (NORM2) has the following logical
formalization: ∀x x(tradesmen) ∧ x(GrantingAccessCommercial
Goods) ∧ x(AnyCircunstance) ⇒ O x(GrantAccessCommercial
Goods), that is, “for all x, if x is a tradesmen and if there is an
opportunity to grant access to commercial goods, then one has
the obligation to grant access to them”;

(4) By specification, one obtains that:
a. “restaurant owners” is an instantiation of “tradesmen”;
b. “entrance in the restaurant” (NORM1) is an instantiation of
“granting access to commercial goods” (NORM2);
c. “with dogs” (NORM1) is an instantiation of “in any circumstance”
(NORM2);
(5) One can consistently formulate a technical rule the content of
which is “the only means for a blind person to autonomously move
about is with the aid of a guide dog”;81
(6) Under the principle of obligation, it is obligatory, under the obligation
to x, to perform all actions logically necessary to satisfy all obligations
derived from x;82
(7) The obligation to “grant access to commercial goods” entails the
obligation to allow for the “entrance to consumers in the restaurant”
which, in turn, entails the obligation to allow for the “entrance in
the restaurant of blind consumers with guide dogs”;
(8) One can logically derive from NORM2 a duty directed at restaurant
owners to allow for the “entrance in the restaurant of blind
consumers with guide dogs”;

80. See Hillel Steiner, Directed Duties and Inalienable Rights, 123 ETHICS 230 (2013).
81. I refer to technical rules in the sense of Von Wright’s technical norms, “concerned
with the means to be used for the sake of attaining a certain end.” See VON WRIGHT, supra
note 52, at 9 ff.
82. Carlos Alchourrón & Eugenio Bulygin, Fundamentos Pragmáticos para una
Lógica de Normas, in ANÁLISIS LÓGICO Y DERECHO 155, 159 (1991).
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(9) NORM2 is a constitutional norm, therefore it prevails over
NORM1 (N2↑N1).
With the previous paragraphs I intended to show that “descriptive relevance”
(as in description of “declared relevance”) need not be explicit in the sense
of subject to express linguistic formulation. The generic antecedent of
legal principles entails a great deal of relevance: by “declaring” relevant
a “generic action-type” in “generic occasions,” the lawmaker is logically
declaring relevant all specific action-tokens of such generic action in any
specific circumstance of such generic occasion.83 See below:
TABLE II

Now, unlike the owner of Barnaby, the owner of Cassius is not
“prescribing relevance” from the viewpoint of evaluative judgments over
the standard of relevance. He is rather describing the “declared relevance”
of himself (as being member to a category of equals that are “blind”), the
action-type (entering into restaurant) and the occasion (with guide dogs).
It could be said that, in making a case through the application of a constitutional
norm that grants specific consumer rights to “all” in accessing to commercial
goods, the owner of Cassius is arguing for “differentiation” vis-à-vis the
norm that forbids entering the restaurant with dogs. He would be claiming
for a judgment of difference by sustaining a partition of the set of objects
in two mutually excluding and jointly exhaustive classes: the class of
objects different amongst themselves under a given standard of evaluation
that is of “autonomous and independent movement.” A partition would be
set between, one the one hand, persons with the ability to move about
autonomously, without any aid and, on the other, persons who cannot
move about without the aid of a guide dog).
83.
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The owner of Barnaby would then be sustaining that a flawed criterion
was used for categorization in the descriptive component of NORM1 for
he should not have been declared “equal,” rather he should have been declared
“different.” But “differentiation” is a conclusion. In substance, all the
owner of Barnaby is really doing is availing himself of the implicit “normative
relevance” of the property of himself (blind consumer), his action-token
(entering in the restaurant), and the circumstance (with guide dogs) visà-vis NORM2, as described above, together with the technical rule “the
only means for a blind person to autonomously move about is with the aid
of a guide dog.” If that claim holds, that, and that alone, amounts to the
“differentiation.” And talk of “differentiation” adds nothing substantial to
it.
Relevance was defined above as the relation of a property of a particular
with a given standard. But one can ask: “relevant for what?” In prescriptive
contexts, the relation of a property of a particular with a given standard is
relevant for a deontic status under a given norm: the deontic status of an
action-type performed by a particular in a certain occasion. For instance,
occasion “with dogs” and property “blindness” are relevant for both deontic
status F and P vis-à-vis, respectively, NORM1 and NORM2. “Not entering
the restaurant” is an action-type irrelevant for both deontic status F and P
vis-à-vis, respectively, NORM1 and NORM2. See below:
TABLE III

In turn, one can envisage contributive and sufficient relevance for being
“equal” or “different”:
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(1) “blindness” is a prima facie contributively irrelevant property
for being “different” for deontic status P vis-à-vis NORM2;
(2) “blindness” is a prima facie contributively irrelevant property
for the purposes of being “equal” for deontic status F (i.e., the
correlative obligation “O” for restaurant-owners) vis-à-vis
NORM1;
(3) “X(blind) entering in the restaurant with a guide dog” is prima
facie sufficiently irrelevant for being “different” and prima facie
sufficiently relevant for being “equal” for deontic status F visà-vis NORM1;
(4) “X(blind) entering in the restaurant with a guide dog” is all
thing considered sufficiently relevant for being “equal” and
all thing considered sufficiently irrelevant for being “different”
for deontic status P vis-à-vis NORM2—as NORM2 trumps
NORM1 (N2↑N1);84
Since NORM 1 and NORM 2 conflict, it seems that the overlap which
is a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition for normative conflicts entails
that relevance of addressees, action-types and occasions is identical vis-àvis NORM1 and NORM2. Yet there is one slight difference:
(1) while property of addressee “blind” conjoined with actiontype “entering in the restaurant” are sufficiently irrelevant for
deontic status F vis-à-vis NORM1, “entering in the restaurant”
and occasion “with guide dogs” are conditionally relevant
for deontic status P vis-à-vis NORM2;
(2) this is to say that, changing the viewpoint for the correlative
of the constitutional right, that “tradesmen” (specified as
“restaurant owners”) have the conditional duty or obligation
(“O”) directed at “consumers” to grant access to commercial
goods (specified as “allowing entrance in the restaurant”) insofar
such consumers are blind and presupposing the technical rule
“the only means for a blind person to autonomously move
about is with the aid of a guide dog” holds;
(3) A contrario, action-type “entering in the restaurant” with a
“guide dog” for members “non-blind” of the category of addressees
84. The works of Araszkiewicz, Hage, and Sampaio provide some insightful ideas.
See Michał Araszkiewicz, Analogy, Similarity and Factors, ICAIL ‘11: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
13 TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 101 (2011);
Jaap Hage, The Logic of Analogy in the Law, 19 ARGUMENTATION 401 (2005); Jorge Silva
Sampaio, Brute Balancing, Proportionality and Meta-Weighing of Reasons, in PROPORTIONALITY,
BALANCING, AND RIGHTS: ROBERT ALEXY’S THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 49 (JanReinard Sieckmann ed., 2021).
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“consumers” is conditionally relevant for the negation of the
duty or obligation (“O”) directed at “consumers” to grant access
to commercial goods (specified as “allowing entrance in the
restaurant”); the negation of such duty (“¬O”) entails a “weak
permission” of non-prohibition, addressed at the restaurant owners,
to refrain from letting members “non-blind” enter with “guidedogs.”85
See below:
TABLE IV

85. Whether or not the negation of prohibition entails a permission is one of the most
discussed subjects in legal theory. Claiming that such permission is entailed, see HANS
KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY: A TRANSLATION OF THE FIRST
EDITION OF THE REINE RECHTSLEHRE OR PURE THEORY OF LAW 84 (Bonnie Litschewski
Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Clarendon Press 1992) (1934), and, with a slight difference,
KELSEN, supra note 30, at 245–46. Claiming that it merely amounts to an “undefined deontic
status” of non-prohibition, see Eugenio Bulygin, Sobre la Equivalencia Pragmática entre
Permiso y no Prohibición, 33 DOXA 283 (2010). I fully agree with Bulygin here.
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The conditional relevance of properties has the consequence of bearers
of the directed duty being obligated to disregard any previous declaration
of blind persons as “equal” and “differentiate” vis-à-vis NORM1. But blind
persons are only “differentiated” vis-à-vis NORM1 because they were “equated”
under NORM2. If restaurant owners are under the obligation prescribed
by NORM2 to allow entrance in the restaurant and, furthermore, allowing
for the entrance with a “guide dog” is logically necessary for that successful
state of affairs, then, under the principle of obligation, they are obligated
to allow it.
4. Relevance and “Inclusiveness Optimality”
You have noticed that, in the example above, the owner of Cassius made
allegations of relevance without prescribing hypothetical relevance of
properties to the legal system. He did not argue for an “axiological gap,”
complain over an “unfair decision,” or conduct a bad (moral or economic)
evaluation over the restaurant prohibition. The hypothesis of conditional
relevance of his “blindness” and the application of the technical rule that
required him being accompanied by the “guide dog” to enter the restaurant
was not external to the legal system.86 He did not care much for allegations
of relevance regarding the metaphysical spirit of the legal system or the
rhetorical force of “discrimination.” Neither did he wish to politically
improve the micro-system of norms applicable to him. He was faithful to
Occam’s razor and simply made allegations of relevance regarding an applicable
constitutional norm. In fact, he accepted that he had been declared “equal”
under NORM1 with deontic status F. And in lieu of prescribing relevance
and claiming he should have been deemed “different” under NORM1 with
deontic status F—being additionally permitted to enter, which does not
logically follow from the negation of the prohibition—in turn he claimed
that he, along with his action-token and the circumstances, had been declared
“equal” under NORM2 with deontic status P. He merely claimed that NORM2
was applicable to his case, that he was “equal” vis-à-vis such norm and that
NORM2 prevailed and trumped the restaurant prohibition (NORM1).
Nothing more.
The owner of Cassius was well aware that, if one wishes to make a case
de lege lata as opposed to politically improve the law de lege ferenda, the
standard of relevance that one should allege (i.e., his “blindness”) is necessarily
a legal standard of relevance. Allegations of relevance of properties to
86. Differently, on hypothesis of relevance being necessarily external to the legal
system under the so-called opaque model (i.e., that does not allow for considering the goals,
values or reasons underlying legal norms), see ALCHOURRÓN & BULYGIN, supra note 40,
at 153 ff. Sustaining a transparent model, see Jorge L. Rodríguez, Lagunas Axiológicas y
Relevancia Normativa, 22 DOXA 349, 355 ff. (1999).
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solve a legal case are necessarily a product of a discovery within the law.
Symmetrically, and epistemologically speaking, incomplete knowledge
of the legal relevance of properties is only incomplete inasmuch one has
incomplete knowledge of the set of norms that composes the law.87 Taking
stock, descriptive relevance of properties should, therefore, be adjusted.
On the one hand, it should be divided into prima facie descriptive relevance
and all things considered descriptive relevance; on the other, it should
take into account the differentiation between rules (second order reasons
or “exclusionary reasons”—for example, reasons that exclude considering
pros and cons and unburden the decision-maker of questioning or even
conceiving of the possibility of acting in manner different than that which
is prescribed in the rule) and principles (first order reasons for action). In
view of the above:
(1) a property is prima facie relevant iff (i) some rule, or
microsystem of rules, of the legal system represents such
property in the antecedent and (ii) that property (x) and its
complementary property (¬ x) are assigned different deontic
status—i.e., if the legal system correlates the existence of such
property and its negation with different normative solutions;
(2) a property is all things considered relevant iff (i) though a
given property is deemed irrelevant by a single rule (or a
microsystem of rules), one concludes, through trumping
“exclusionary reasons” and extending of the standard of
relevance (the set of relevant norms), that such property is
deemed conditionally or unconditionally relevant by other
norms, notably by principles (i.e., metanorms that justify rules).88
One can see that the result of NORM2 prevailing over NORM1 is
equivalent to a normative proposition according to which “no dogs are
allowed in the restaurant except for guide dogs for the blind.” The carvingout of the exception in NORM1 arises out of the external normative

87. It is purely a matter of not exhausting the descriptive activity. Similarly, but
with slightly different arguments, see Stuart Hampshire, Public and Private Morality, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 23 (Stuart Hampshire et al. eds., 1978); Rodríguez, supra
note 86, at 355 ff.
88. See RATTI, supra note 13, at 67 (although Ratti is focusing on “temporal order”
of intellectual operations of identifying the thesis of relevance and the hypothesis of relevance).
On metanorms that justify other norms and rules as exclusionary reasons, see RAZ, supra
note 37, at 187 ff; Alexander, supra note 37, at 5–22.
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defeater that is the joint proposition of the applicability of NORM2 together
with the proposition of prevalence (“external application”) of NORM2
over NORM1. From another viewpoint, NORM2 implicitly declares the
conditional relevance of “blindness” of addressees and occasions of “accessing
commercial goods” with the aid of “guide dogs” for deontic status P, thus
trumping the irrelevance of such properties for deontic status P vis-à-vis
NORM1. Such a normative proposition is a refined version of the two
applicable norms:
(1) NORM1 has the logical formalization ∀ x x(EnterRest) ∧
x(WithDog) ⇒ F x(EnterRest), that is, “for all x, if there is an
opportunity to enter the restaurant with dogs, then one ought
not to enter restaurants with dogs”;
(2) NORM2 has the logical formalization ∀ x x(consumers) ∧
x(AccessingCommercialGoods) ∧ x(AnyCircunstance) ⇒ P
x(AccessingCommercialGoods), that is, “for all x, if x is a consumer
and if there is an opportunity to access commercial goods,
then one has the permission to access them”;
(3) NORM2 prevails over NORM1 (N2↑N1);
(4) NORM2 prevailing over NORM1 entails formulating the
normative proposition according to which “for all x, if there
is an opportunity to enter the restaurant with dogs, then one
ought not to enter restaurants with dogs, except if x is blind
and the dog is a guide dog”; this is logically formalized as ∀ x
iff x(¬blind) ∧ x[WithDog(¬WalkingDog)] ∧ x(EnterRest) ⇒ F
x(EnterRest);
(5) The conditional prohibition above entails, by a contrario,
normative proposition ∀ x iff x(blind) ∧ x(WithWalkingDog)
∧ x(EnterRest) ⇒ P x(EnterRest), which is consistent with ∀ x
x(consumers) ∧ x(AccessingCommercialGoods) ∧ x(Any
Circunstance) ⇒ P x(AccessingCommercialGoods).
Suppose now that Cassius, the guide dog, was from an extremely dangerous
breed of dogs and would most likely endanger the health of clients of the
restaurant. To make his case of protecting the clients, the restaurant owner
will make allegations of relevance of property “dangerous breed” with regards
the occasion of “entering the restaurant.” In doing so, he will claim for the
implicit relevance of property “dangerous breed” vis-à-vis NORM3,
a constitutional norm according to which “health of citizens ought to be
protected.”
Again, the owner of the restaurant is arguing for the conditional relevance
of property “dangerous breed” vis-à-vis the deontic status F under NORM3,
irrespective of the property “dangerous breed” being deemed unconditionally
irrelevant vis-à-vis the deontic status F under NORM2. Again, the restaurant
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owner accepted that the owner of Cassius had been declared “equal” under
NORM2 with deontic status P and the normative proposition that followed,
granting an exception. And in lieu of prescribing relevance of property
“dangerous breed” and claiming the occasion should have been deemed
“different” under NORM2 with deontic status P (thus, being forbidden to
enter), he should claim that such occasion (“dogs of dangerous breed”)
had been declared “equal” under NORM3 with deontic status F. And that
includes “guide dogs of dangerous breed,” for the occasion of “guide dogs”
was deemed irrelevant for deontic status P under NORM3. The owner
of the restaurant would be sustaining that a flawed criterion was used for
categorization for Cassius, the dangerous guide dog, should not have been
declared “equal” under NORM2. Again, in substance, all the restaurant
owner is really doing is availing himself of the implicit “normative relevance”
of the property of the circumstance (entering the restaurant with “dangerous
guide dogs”), together with the technical rule “the only means for protecting
health from a dangerous dog is by keeping it away from people.” The restaurant
owner is thus formulating an even more refined normative proposition:
(1) normative proposition according to which “for all x, if there
is an opportunity to enter the restaurant with dogs, then one
ought not to enter restaurants with dogs, except if x is blind
and the dog is a guide dog” is logically formalized as ∀ x iff
x(¬blind) ∧ x[WithDog(¬WalkingDog)] ∧ x(EnterRest) ⇒ F
x(EnterRest); this normative proposition follows from
NORM2 prevailing over NORM1 (N2↑N1);
(2) NORM3 is logically formalized as ∀ x x(all) ∧ x(Endangering
Health) ∧ x(AnyCircunstance) ⇒ F x(EndangeringHealth),
that is, “for all x, if there is an opportunity to endanger
health, then one is forbidden to do so”;
(3) NORM2 and NORM3 have the same hierarchy and conflict;
however, a rational balancing between them should determine
that NORM3 is circumstantially weightier than NORM2 (N3↑N2);
(4) NORM3 prevailing over NORM2 entails formulating
the normative proposition according to which “for all x, if
x is blind and there is an opportunity to enter the restaurant
with guide dogs, then x is permitted to enter restaurants with
guide dogs, except if the guide dog is from a dangerous
breed”; this is logically formalized as ∀ x iff x(blind) ∧ x[With
WalkingDog(¬DangerousBreed)] ∧ x(EnterRest) ⇒ P x(EnterRest);
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(5) The conditional permission above entails, by a contrario,
normative proposition ∀ x iff x(blind) ∧ x[WithWalkingDog
(DangerousBreed)] ∧ x(EnterRest) ⇒ F x(EnterRest), which is
consistent with ∀ x x(all) ∧ x(EndangeringHealth) ∧
x(AnyCircunstance) ⇒ F x(EndangeringHealth).
The owner of Cassius could still counter-argue with muzzling Cassius
and introducing further exceptions. I shall however refrain from further
exemplifying the progressive refinement of normative propositions as the
idea has been sufficiently expounded. It suffices to say that the refinement
of norm propositions with aggregated exceptions is equivalent to the
progressive construction of a “complete normative proposition.” In formulating
the latter, and in addition to the relevance declared by the applicable norm
at hand, relevance is bestowed upon all properties of a given legal case
that instantiate hypothetical properties explicitly or implicitly represented
in a certain legal system.89
Naturally, the transformation of such a “complete normative propositions”
into a “complete norm”—an “all-things-considered norm” and “all-normsconsidered norm”—is purely chimerical. Defeasibility precludes that any
norm can solely declare in its antecedent “sufficient relevance” for its
consequent90 Norms are deemed necessarily to be suboptimal, therefore
lawmaking necessarily presupposes the implicit insertion of a clause of
“that’s it” relevance-wise.91
In fact, it is either the case that norms are over-inclusive by differentiating
too little or under-inclusive by differentiating too much. In other words, it
is (i) either that norms prescribe x and lack the ascription of relevance to
properties that are declared relevant by other norms which prescribe the
negation of x (ii) or that norms prescribe x and exceed in ascribing
relevance to properties that are deemed irrelevant by other norms of the
legal system that prescribe the negation of x.
Does this mean that the issue is theoretical and addressing it is simply
idle? Quite the contrary. The conclusions on completeness of normative
89. Properties of action-performer, action-token, and circumstances.
90. On the correlation of cases with maximal solutions, see ALCHOURRÓN & BULYGIN,
supra note 40, at 79. Claiming that for any norm N, N is complete iff its antecedent
includes all the conditions the instantiation of which the consequent depends upon, see
Luis Duarte D’Almeida, Norme Giuridiche Complete, 2009 ANALISI E DIRITTO 197, 212.
On the foundations of the skepticism regarding the possibility of complete normative
propositions (the cause of which is “defeasibility”), see Sartor, supra note 69, at 119, 143–
44; BAYÓN, supra note 69, at 338.
91. On suboptimality of norms, see SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 100–02. On the “that’s
it” clause in moral reasoning, see Garrett Cullity & Richard Holton, Particularism and
Moral Theory: Principles and Particularisms, 76 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y (SUPP.
VOLS.) 169, 199–209 (2002).
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propositions prove fruitful for the purposes of addressing “equality” and
“difference” in both expository legal reasoning and lawmaking.
Firstly, it shows that complete normative proposition should not be constructed
as including prescription of relevance to all properties of the case
according to external moral or economic evaluation. Since the standard of
relevance is a “constructed” and relevance is “declared” by lawmakers, a
complete normative proposition is rather that which embeds declarations
of relevance by accounting for the maximal extension of the applicable
standard of relevance. In a nutshell, it entails co-extensivity between the
relevance declared in Normx and the relevance declared in the maximal
account of the applicable standard of relevance. The complete normative
proposition departs from the applicable norm at hand and further “differentiates”
by inserting exceptions of “equals” represented in the antecedent of all
norms prevailing over the former.
Secondly, the chimerical nature of “complete norms” provides a realistic
tone to “narrow tailoring” in lawmaking, specifically in the design of
categories. It has been stated that “[n]arrow tailoring demands that the fit
between the government’s action and its asserted purpose be ‘as perfect
as practicable’. . . [it] means that legislation must be neither overinclusive nor
underinclusive.”92 But suppression of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness
is completely unrealistic93: it suffices to show how dreadfully long the
norm statement at the restaurant would have to be to relevantly account
for guide dogs, dangerous breeds, muzzling, defective materials, etc. But
more: aiming at the suppression of overinclusiveness is wholly focused
on the “guidance value” provided by legal norms. This, however, is a partial
assessment of the “lawmaker’s challenge” as it leaves out many factors
that point towards a different outcome, notably pursuing the “private ordering
value” and the “power allocation value” in lawmaking.94
92. Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict
Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 360–61 (2006).
93. For the sake of simplicity, I shall from now on refer exclusively to
overinclusiveness as, from a logical standpoint, the underinclusiveness of a permissive
norm is equivalent to the overinclusiveness of a prohibitive norm. See Jorge L. Rodríguez,
Against Defeasibility of Rules, in THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY
89, 93–94 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti eds., 2012).
94. On these concepts, see Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 14, 28 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds.,
2011). On the issue of optimal specificity, although with a different take on the subject,
see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision
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Thirdly, I intend to show below that “inclusiveness optimality” depends
upon requirements of suitability and necessity in the formulation of a
RuleCatg that simply do not provide for one right answer. Getting back to
Hart, lawmakers are men, not gods, and there is no way around relative
ignorance of fact and relative indeterminacy of aim in lawmaking.95
Let me first illustrate this point through zoology. Suppose one is designing
the category of mammals around the prototype “humans”. If a given
suitable standard of relevance assigns relevance to a) mammary glands,
b) a neocortex and c) fur or hair, then “bats” are included in the category.
But now “mammals” (at least one of them) can fly. At first sight, this would
not be a problem as the “tunnel vision” of “declared equality” made the
dissimilarity between “bats” and other members of category “mammals”
—that of “flying”—irrelevant. But the addition of “bats” to the category
entails that one similarity fact can be asserted between a member of the
category of “mammals” and, say, a pterodactyl. You see the risk here.
Designing categories entails risks because the addition of members to a
category has implications: on the one hand, the increase of internal dissimilarities
between members and, on the other, similarity facts being assertable between
members and non-members of the category. Exemplifying the latter:
norms that govern how to treat “mammals” but do not assign relevance
to “flying” may prove unsuitable and over-inclusive vis-à-vis “bats”. And
norms that govern “flying creatures” and assign relevance to “mammary
glands” may prove to be under-inclusive vis-à-vis “pterodactyls”. Naturally,
lawmaking is not zoology: the aim of categorizing in prescriptive contexts
is different. Unlike zoology, in which “relevant properties” for categorizing
are relatively stable, lawmaking is prone to changes, even disruptions, in
shifting “relevant properties”: lawmaking entails frequently changing the
RulesCatg.96 However different the goal of categorization in prescriptive
contexts, it appears to also be the case that the advantage in inserting
“bats” in the category of mammals should prove to be higher to the disadvantage
under a given criterion. That should happen with any suitable criteria for
categorization.

in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1994); Francesco Parisi & Vincy Fon, Optimal Specificity
in Law, in THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING 9 (2009). On the “lawmaker’s challenge”, see
Hrafn Asgeirsson, Vagueness, Comparative Value, and the “Lawmakers’ Challenge”, 98 ASRP:
ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE [ARCHIVE FOR PHIL. OF L. & SOC. PHIL.] 299
(2012).
95. See HART, supra note 46, at 128.
96. See, e.g., the same-sex marriage example.
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C. The Content of “Prescriptive Equality”
The previous chapters made it almost clear that the vast majority of
problems related with categorization and the institution of “equals” and
“differents”, as well as contributive and sufficient relevance or irrelevance
for a deontic status has nothing to do with “prescriptive equality” per se.
Equality as a prescriptive concept has been ill-constructed inasmuch, as stated
above, it has been affirmed that it is simultaneously “the concept through
which it is prescribed, or constructed, a comparative relation between two
or more objects, two or more actions and two or more circumstances”
and “the prescription to treat equals equally and differents differently.”97
And the overall problem, I suppose, is related with conceiving equality in
prescriptive concepts as an overarching idea rather than focusing of the
properties of the “norm of equality”, i.e., the norm content or that which
is prescribed.98 One should therefore deploy an old analytical truism: “one
thing is one thing, and another is another.”99
The careful analysis of the invariant components of any norm—“prescriptive
equality” alike—shows otherwise. First, it seems obvious that “comparing”
and “treating” are two different actions. “Comparing” is a specific action
which entails examining or looking for similarities and dissimilarities between
two or more things. To a certain extent, it entails measuring similarities
between a and b and asserting (dis)similarity facts. “Treating,” on the other
hand, is a generic action—or, if you will, a highly unspecific action in Raz’s
conceptual apparatus—which consists in behaving towards someone or dealing
with something in a particular way.100 That alone suffices to affirm that
these two behaviors cannot be simultaneously governed by one and the same
norm, insofar sound individuation criteria entails that one norm governs
one action-type.101 I will try to illustrate my point with the aid of VON
WRIGHT’s implicit conditions for the exercise of the norm-content.
VON WRIGHT drew his own division of categorical and hypothetical
norms from Kant’s theory of imperatives. He claimed that the condition
of application of elementary norms is the condition which must be satisfied

97. Cf. Comanducci, supra note 7, at 34, 36.
98. See id. (Highlighting “equality” as an “idea” in prescriptive contexts.)
99. See ECHAVE, URQUIJO & GUIBOURG, supra note 22, at 83–85.
100. I am using the definitions in the Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.
org. As for generic and unspecific actions, see Lopes, supra note 70, at 476; Raz, supra
note 78, at 836–38.
101. RAZ, supra note 45, at 70–92.

371

LOPESNEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/27/2022 10:36 AM

if there is to be an opportunity (Opp) for doing the thing which is the
content of a given norm (i.e., the permitted or obligatory action). This is a
matter of logical implication. There cannot be a (valid) command obligating
Ø if, under circumstances x, there is no Opp to Øing: impossibilium est
nulla obligatio.102 Norms regulate “contingent behavior”, not that behavior
which is impossible or necessary.103
Norm statement1 “one ought to close the door” may didactically be
deemed “categorical”, even though the logically dependent condition
of the consequent is implied (i.e., the door being open and not closing by
itself): the condition of the norm is, in this case, as von Wright claims,
“given” together with the norm-content (VON WRIGHT 1963, 74). The
norm statement may also (didactically) be deemed “universal” although it
encompasses conditions of application that are contrary to universality of
application: no norm is universally applicable. Conditions of the normantecedent have a fit and are necessarily “connected” (functionalized) to
the consequent. Differently, norm statement2 “one ought to close the door
when it rains” may didactically be deemed “hypothetical” since the norm
entails, in addition to its logically dependent condition (i.e., the door being
open and not closing by itself), a logically independent condition of the
consequent, i.e., the state of affairs “raining”. The norm may (didactically)
be deemed “occasional” simply because the antecedent encompasses such
conditions which logically independent from the consequent.
If one accepts von Wright’s claim—and I do believe there are no reasons
to do otherwise—the opportunities to “treat a and b equally” and the
opportunities to “compare a and b” are different and, although the former
presupposes the latter, logically independent. For instance, “comparing”
requires two objects, instruments of measurement and probably—although
this is not consensual—commensurability. On the other hand, “treating equals
equally” requires a previous “declaration” of equality, that is, a “category”
which was instituted pursuant to a RuleCatg. In fact, the “declaration” of
equality for class-creation does indeed presuppose comparison to the
extent that any declaration of “equality” entails selecting “relevant properties”
out of asserted similarity facts between two or more objects. But the fact
that “treating equals equally” presupposes a previous comparison deemed
necessary for “class-creation” does not amount to say that it is the same

102. VON WRIGHT, supra note 52, at 73 ff.
103. Stating that the content of norms cannot be neither alethically necessary (“die
Menschen sollen sterben”) nor factually impossible (“die Menschen sollen nicht sterben”),
see HANS KELSEN & OLIVIER BEAUD, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DES NORMES [GENERAL THEORY
OF NORMS] 43–45 (Fabrice Malkani & Olivier Beaud trans., Presses Universitaires de
France 1996) (1979); CARLOS S. NINO, INTRODUCCIÓN AL ANÁLISIS DEL DERECHO 291 (2d
rev. ed. 2003).
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action-type. Quite the contrary. Just like paying income tax presupposes
collecting a salary, these are two different actions. In fact, “comparing”,
“declaring equality” and “treating equals equally” are three autonomous
and logically independent actions.
The logical independency of actions “comparing,” “declaring equality,”
and “treating equals equally” is made clear by acknowledging the following
facts. The action of “comparing” does not require “declaring equality”
among terms of comparison, neither does it require “treating equals equally”
let alone “treating differents differently”; it is perfectly possible that one
compares a and b and subsequently does not “declare” equality between
a and b (nor the “difference” between them); it is also perfectly possible
that one compares a and b and subsequently, pursuant to a declaration of
equality, treats a and b differently—or, pursuant to a declaration of difference,
treats a and b equally (unlawfully, that is). A fortiori, the action of “declaring
equality” by itself does not require “treating equals equally and differents
differently”. Lastly, it is not required that the addressee of the command
to “treat equals equally” or “treat differents differently” performed a previous
comparison or even declared “equality” or “difference.” In fact, that is
hardly the case; the restaurant owner in the example above was required
to “treat equals equally and differents differently” but, as stated, he had
no credential over “declaring” equals and differents: he merely abided by
the applicable norms of the legal system.
It seems paradoxical to claim, as Comanducci does, that “prescriptive
equality” is “the concept through which it is prescribed, or constructed, a
comparative relation between two or more objects, two or more actions
and two or more circumstances.” “Prescriptive equality” presupposes
“declared equality” and the latter presupposes assertion of similarity facts
which, in turn, presupposes comparison (two or more objects, instruments
of measurement, and so on). As Gianformaggio claims, “in order to prescriptively
equate things, the legislator first equates them descriptively.” 104 To
formulate a category, for the purposes of the descriptive component of the
norm of equality, is to “declare equality”—that is, to declare that a and b
are “treated” by law in the same fashion.105 How could it be that “prescriptive
equality” governs actions—that of “comparing” and “categorizing”—that
it itself presupposes? It is illogical for when similarity facts are being
asserted through comparison, equality has not yet been declared. This means
104.
105.

Gianformaggio, supra note 6, at 271
Guastini, supra note 23, at 196.
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that a category as not been instituted and the requirements for “prescriptive
equality” have not been met for there is no “equal” nor “different”, only
“similar” and “dissimilar” or “identical” and “non-identical.” How could
the norm of equality be triggered then? In logical terms, it is inconsistent
and ill-suited to claim that “prescriptive equality” governs an action that
is a necessary condition for declared equality which, in turn, is a sufficient
condition for “prescriptive equality.” That, and that alone, should suffice
to remove from the content of prescriptive equality the action of “comparing”
or “categorizing.”
Furthermore, the fact that the descriptive component of the norm of
equality represents the product of an action (a “category” qua product of
the “action of categorization”) does not entail that such action, the product
of which is represented in the antecedent, is governed by such norm. Quite
the contrary. Let me exemplify this with a different norm:
(1) The norm of equality is uttered through statement “treat
equals equally,” reconstructed as “For all x, if there is
an opportunity to [treat equally], then one ought to [treat
equally]”. I shall use (PrescEqu) with the meaning of “treating
equal”. The norm statement is logically described as ∀ x
x(Opp PrescEqu) ⇒x(PrescEqu); this is the same as ∀ x
x(DescEqu) ⇒x(PrescEqu) because “descriptive equality”
is a precondition for “prescriptive equality”. (DescEqu) =
(Opp PrescEqu).
(2) For the sake of the example, suppose a norm statement
according to which “If taxi drivers go on strike, then
unions ought to declare it”, clarified as “For all x (unions),
if there is an opportunity to [declare strike] and taxi drivers
go on strike, then x (unions) ought to [declare strike]”. This
norm is “hypothetical” because the condition [taxi drivers
going on strike] is logically independent from [unions declaring
strike]. The norm statement is logically described as ∀ x(unions)
x(Opp DeclStrike) ∧ (TaxiStrike) ⇒x(DeclStrike).
(3) The action governed by the norm statement in (iii) is
“declaring (strike) and the addressees are “unions”. Taxi
drivers going on strike is simply the occasion or states of
affairs foreseen as a condition in the antecedent.
(4) “Declaring strike” and “going on strike” are two different
actions but the norm at stake only governs one, that of
“declaring”. The deontic status of “going on strike” should
be found elsewhere, most likely in a constitutional norm
that foresees the freedom of employees to go on strike
unconditionally or under certain conditions.
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I believe this suffices to clarify that “prescriptive equality” neither governs
the action of “comparing” nor that of “categorizing,” rather it presupposes
both. Now, I have claimed above that the consequent of the “norm of
equality” demands only to treat equals equally and I have claimed that
“treating” is a generic action.106 One can treat persons, actions, or circumstances
in many different ways. The norm of equality “narrows” the scope of
opportunities foreseen in the antecedent in such a way that, when treating
persons, actions, or circumstances, one ought to treat them equally. The
opportunity to treat equally merely presupposes a previous establishment
or institution of equality between a group of persons, actions, or circumstances,
precisely that of categorization (i.e., the declaration of the so-called “descriptive
equality”).107 The same happens for the opportunity to treat differently.
See below:
(1) The norm of equality is uttered through statement “obligation
to treat equals equally”, reconstructed as “For all x, if there
is an opportunity to [treat equally], then one ought to [treat
equally]”. (PrescEqu) = “treating equal”. The norm statement
is logically described as ∀ x x(Opp PrescEqu) ⇒ O x(PrescEqu),
the same as ∀ x x(DescEqu) ⇒ O x(PrescEqu) because
“descriptive equality” is a precondition for “prescriptive
equality”. (DescEqu) = (Opp PrescEqu); “O” = obligation.
(2) By adding the strict biconditional in the antecedent we logically
obtain the negation in the consequent; one can only obtain a
contrario through strict biconditionals: ∀ x iff x(DescEqu) ⇒
O x(PrescEqu) or ∀ x x(DescEqu) ⇔ x(PrescEqu). This
entails that a negation of “descriptive equality” in the antecedent
(i.e., a “descriptive difference” or “declaration” of difference)
normatively implies the negation of “prescriptive equality”
in the consequent:
P1: ∀ x iff x(DescEqu) ⇒ O x(PrescEqu) or x(DescEqu)⇔
x(PrescEqu)
P2: x(¬DescEqu)

106. The norm of equality is therefore a “principle”. See Lopes, supra note 70, at
479 ff.
107. Prescriptive equality does not function absent previous categorization. Categorization, in turn, presupposes asserting a similarity fact between at least two particulars and
the selection of a RuleCatg that sets out the criterion for the relevant property, but that
RuleCatg which prescribes “relevance” may only result from a given legal systemx.
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C: ¬O x(PrescEqu);
(3) The negation of descriptive equality does not amount to a
prescription of difference, as seen in (ii). It merely amounts
to the non-obligation to treat equally, that is a weak permission
to treat differently which, in turn, amounts to an “undefined
deontic status;”108
(4) The prescription of equality and difference arises from
positively constructed norms with strict biconditionals:
(a) “For all x, if there is an opportunity to [treat equally],
then one ought to [treat equally]”, logically described as
∀ x iff x(DescEqu) ⇒ O x(PrescEqu); a contrario, ∀ x
x(¬DescEqu) ⇒ ¬O x(PrescEqu);
(b) “For all x, if there is an opportunity to [treat differently],
then one ought to [treat differently]”, logically described
as ∀ x iff x(DescDiff) ⇒ O x(PrescDiff); a contrario, ∀ x
x(¬DescDiff) ⇒ ¬O x(PrescDiff);
With the latter I intended to show that “prescriptive equality” prescribes
nothing more and nothing less than to treat equals equally.109 Additionally,
I intended to show that “prescriptive difference” does not logically follow
from “prescriptive equality” a contrario sensu. Both norms presuppose a
previous declaration of “equality” or “difference,” as stated above, but the
negation of the antecedent of the norm of equality with a strict biconditional
only amounts to a permission to differentiate. However, the negation of
the antecedent of “prescriptive equality” is equivalent to the antecedent of
“prescriptive difference” and the negation of the antecedent of “prescriptive
difference” is equivalent to the negation of the antecedent of “prescriptive
equality.”
“Prescriptive equality” and “prescriptive difference” are logically independent
to the extent it is possible that a given legal systemx (i) includes a prescription
to treat equals equally and does not include a prescription to treat differents
differently, (ii) includes a prescription to treat differents differently and
does not include a prescription to treat equals equally, (iii) includes both
a prescription to treat equals equally and a prescription to treat differents
differently or (iv) includes neither. In any case, “prescriptive equality” and
“prescriptive difference” are two independent norms. The fact that they
are customarily accepted in most legal systems does not make them other
than “contingent” to enactment. This is one more reason to nurture them
as opposed to taking them for granted.

108.
109.
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The single precondition of treating equals equally and differents differently
is that of a previous categorization—which, in turn, requires previous
assertion of similarity facts and selection of a RuleCatg. Not rarely is that
categorization a constitutional one. In constitutions throughout the world,
it is frequent to encounter a provision of the type “all citizens are ‘equal
before the law.’”110 Controversies arise around the precise meaning and
illocutionary force of being equal before the law.
Many scholars assign the meaning of “prescriptive equality” to constitutional
provisions such as the latter. I do not wish to enter the discussion regarding
whether a legal statement can purport to have simultaneous constitutive
and prescriptive (regulative) content. I should say, however, that nothing
seems to prevent it to the extent one can assign two different meanings
(e.g., two different norms) to the statement, one which is constitutive and
one which is regulative. Evidently that does not mean that the constitutive
statement makes it so that citizens are equal. That statement alone is
nonsensical as equality cannot be asserted, rather it is ex definitione instituted,
established or, better yet, “declared.”
For the present purposes, it is relevant to highlight that such a constitutional
provision entails the establishment of equality among citizens. It therefore
amounts to a declaration of a category comprising “members” and “nonmembers”, the RuleCatg of which is “citizenship.”111 In this sense, such
constitutional provisions express constitutive rules according to which
“citizens” count as having the status of “equals” for the purposes of lawcreation and law-application.112 The thesis of relevance put forward is
“whether x is a citizen” and the thesis of irrelevance includes the suppression
of all dissimilarities between citizens.113 Since “citizenship” is a status,
the status of “equal” is a status grounded on a status.
110. Among many, see CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [C.R.P.], art. 13,
no. 1, English translation available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/conteudo/files/
constituicaoingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/77LZ-YR66].
111. Naturally, I do not wish to enter the philosophical discussion of “dignity” and
“equal dignity” here—it would largely transcend the scope of this essay. See JEREMY
WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS (2012); THE ROLE OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION AND
HUMAN DIGNITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIAL WORKSHOPS
HELD AT THE 28TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY IN LISBON, 2017 (Miguel Nogueira de Brito, Rachel
Herdy, Giovanni Damele, Pedro Moniz Lopes & Jorge Silva Sampaio eds. 2019).
112. On this “status function” of the rule, see JOHN SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SOCIAL REALITY 46 ff. (1995); Hindriks, supra note 35, at 200 ff.
113. The category “citizens” is usually reconstructed by other constitutional norms,
notably by extension or restriction. This happens, for instance, with constitutional provisions
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Now, some claim it would be absurd to impose upon all individuals exactly
the same obligations and confer the same duties without any distinction.114
Naturally it is highly undesirable for any reasonable person, but “absurd”
is perhaps too strong of a word because the latter is not logically self contradictory. It would, however, be contradictory with constitutional
provisions that command “promotion of equality.” This requires a clarification.
The constitutional provisions that command “promotion of equality”
have little to do with prescriptive equality. In this case—in which the addressees
are mainly, albeit not exclusively, the lawmaking bodies—the constitutional
norm commands that “differences” ought to be declared in the legislation
in such a way that subsequent prescriptions of different treatment (for example,
according to “prescriptive difference”) are “suitable means” for obtaining
factual equality.
These constitutional provisions are norms that govern the action of
“declaring” equalities and differences, precisely that which is performed
by legislation. Declaration of “differences” in turn, trumps the overarching
declaration of all citizens being “equal before the law.” But, again, this only
means that “differences” should be declared in the legislation so that “equality”
should be obtained. Is should clarify that the latter concept of equality is
being used as “similarity” as pure factual equality does not exist. Similarity
is a goal in the sense of obtaining the removal of factual (and not legal)
barriers or dissimilarities in the real world.
“Prescriptive equality” is not the main point when it comes to constitutional
provisions that command “promotion of equality.” It is “prescriptive difference”
that works as the command to treat differently those which have already
been previous declared “different,” even if they were declared “different”
to for the purpose of shaping the world and removing dissimilarities. This
is so under a technical rule with the following content: “if one aims at removing
dissimilarities in the real world one ought to introduce differentiated
treatment before the law.” Naturally, the degree of difference is fine-tuned
according to necessity criteria.115

that extend the category to “foreign citizens.” See C ONSTITUIÇÃO DA R EPÚBLICA
PORTUGUESA [C.R.P.], art. 15, no. 1, English translation available at http://www.tribunal
constitucional.pt/tc/conteudo/files/constituicaoingles.pdf [[https://perma.cc/77LZ-YR66].
114. See, quoting Kelsen, Guastini, supra note 23, at 194; Gianformaggio, supra note
6, at 271.
115. See Giovanni Sartor, Doing Justice to Rights and Values: Teleological Reasoning
and Proportionality, 18 A.I. & LAW 175, 198 ff. (2010); David Duarte, From Constitutional
Discretion to the Positivist Weight Formula, in PROPORTIONALITY, BALANCING, AND RIGHTS:
ROBERT ALEXY’S THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 11, 29 ff. (Jan R. Sieckman ed., 2021).

378

LOPESNEW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 331, 2022]

10/27/2022 10:36 AM

Relevance and Equality
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISUES

IV. THE TASK AHEAD: PROPORTIONALITY IN “DECLARATIONS” OF
EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE
My previous remarks amount to saying that all prominent discussions
around the several concepts of “prescriptive equality” are, in fact, discussions
regarding the suitability and necessity in the formation of categories, such
as proposals for the “declarations” of equality and difference. They are
placed at the level of the antecedent of “prescriptive equality” and “prescriptive
difference,” not at the consequent. For instance, if a liberal and a feminist
discuss around the concept of equality, they will most likely be discussing
de lege ferenda the institution or declaration of “equalities” and “differences,”
not the prescriptive component of the norms. The liberal will claim that
categories should be built by abiding to RuleCatgx and the feminist will
claim that categories should be built by abiding to RuleCatgy. The feminist
will scrutinize RuleCatgx and claim it is ill-suited for it will provide for
over and under-inclusive categories and the liberal will do the exact same
thing regarding RuleCatgy. Both will be arguing for and against certain
aims, purposes, and criteria. All philosophical arguments exchanged will
be strictly focused on the suitability of categorization, and categories will
correspond to the so-called the “descriptive” component of the norm
of equality.
Speculation on how to epistemologically establish reliable methods,
tests, or criteria for categorization has been going on since the time
of Aristotle.116 But, in legal speech, the formulation of theses of relevance
and theses of irrelevance in categorization should be bound within a
specific fit (i.e., a means-end relation) between the categorization itself (a
means) and the aim (end) to be pursued with the categorization. Holyoak
sustains that, in cognitive science, “analogies are used to achieve the goals
of the reasoner (. . .)” and “mapping is guided not only by relational structure

116. Cumpa, supra note 24, at 3. For theories of categorization, see Mark Turner,
Categories and Analogies, in ANALOGICAL REASONING: PERSPECTIVES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,
COGNITIVE SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 6 ff. (David H. Helman ed., 1988).
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and element similarity but also by the goals of the analogist.”117/118 In establishing
the “declared equality” or the “declared difference,” categorization has goals
so it will draw from the “contextual relevance” given by those goals: generally,
they are constitutional goals.119 Schauer stresses that one generalizes in a
certain direction, and one does so with a given purpose.120 Equality depends
on the “‘intentions’ of the speaker”—that is, the lawmaker.121
Building a model for assessing the suitability and necessity for categorization
is a complicated task since such goals are contingent. But, contingent as
the ends may be, I believe “inclusive optimality” is an invariant to be procured.
And I believe that requirements of suitability and necessity play a large
role in it.
Firstly, suitability is of the utmost importance in lawmaking since it
requires that the means (i.e., categorization) probabilistically increases the
chances of attaining a certain end. In this sense, “declarations of equality”
and “declarations of difference” should have, prognostically speaking, a
high degree of causal relevance in the definition of a “determination schema”:

117. Keith J. Holyoak, Analogy and Relational Reasoning, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THINKING AND REASONING 234, 239, 247 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds.,

2012). In 1990, Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson, and Gochfeld claimed that “problem solving
is not the only purpose of analogy. For example, analogies are often used in explanations,
when we use a source analog to provide understanding of a target phenomenon. Sometimes
the source generates understanding without much modification, but in other cases the
source is used to form new explanatory hypotheses, a process that Thagard [60] calls
analogical abduction. Analogies can be used, not only to form hypotheses, but also to help
evaluate them [61]. Analogies are often used in political, historical, and legal arguments,
functioning to convince someone that a particular conclusion is warranted. For example,
arguments that Nicaragua is in danger of becoming another Cuba are used to support US
intervention, while arguments that it is in danger of becoming another Viet Nam are used
to support a hands-off policy. Finally, literary analogies can have an evocative function,
calling forth relevant emotional responses to past events or situations with established
emotional content.” Paul Thagard, Keith J. Holyoak, Greg Nelson & David Gochfeld, Analog
Retrieval by Constraint Satisfaction, 46 A.I. 259, 260 (1990).
118. Duarte claims that “analogy is goal-oriented: no choice among comparison
factors (. . .) can be carried out except in view of some purpose.” David Duarte, Analogy and
Balancing: The Partial Reducibility Thesis and Its Problems, in ANALOGY AND EXEMPLARY
REASONING IN LEGAL DISCOURSE 87, 98 (Hendrik Kapein & Bastiann van der Velden eds.,
2018).
119. See Gentner, supra note 65, at 220. Seger and Peterson claim that, in psychology and neuroscience, the functions of categorization go well beyond mere grouping: “one
important reason to learn categories is that they provide a basis for inference: knowing that
an item belongs to a category allows one to infer many additional characteristics about the
item. Another is that categories have goals.” Carol A. Seger & Erik J. Peterson, Categorization
= Decision Making + Generalization, 37 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 1187, 1189 (2013).
120. SCHAUER, supra note 16, at 21.
121. Gianformaggio, supra note 6, at 261.
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F is relevant to determining G iff F is a necessary part of some determinant
of G.122 For example:
(1) descriptively: “species are part of the determinant of whether
or not an animal can fly”;123
(2) prescriptively: “WithDog” is part of the determinant of whether
or not a person can enter in a restaurant.
Secondly, I believe necessity also plays a role here. Since categorization
is class-creation, requirements of necessity demand that the expansion of
categories by decreasing relevant properties or the restriction of categories
by increasing relevant properties is subject to a “cost-benefit” analysis,
ultimately connected with “exclusionary reasons” and models of unburdening
decisions with balancing pros and cons.

122.
123.

See Davies, supra note 61, at 244. The works of Todd R. Davies are illuminating.
See id. at 239.
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